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Abstract
Legions of law students in property or trusts and estates courses 
have studied the will dispute, In re Strittmater’s Estate. The 
cases, casebooks, and treatises that cite Strittmater present the 
1947 decision from New Jersey’s highest court as a model of the 
“insane delusion” doctrine. Readers learn that snubbed relatives 
successfully invalidated Louisa Strittmater’s will, which left her 
estate to the Equal Rights Amendment campaign, by convincing 
the court that her radical views on gender equality amounted to 
insanity and, thus, testamentary incapacity. By failing to provide 
any commentary or context on this overt sexism, these sources af-
firm the court’s portrait of Louisa Strittmater as an eccentric 
landlady and fanatical feminist.
This is troubling. Strittmater should be a well-known case, but 
not for the proposition that feminism is an insane delusion. De-
spite the decision’s popularity on law school syllabi, no scholar 
has interrogated the case’s broader historical background. 
Through original archival research, this Article centers 
Strittmater as a case study in how social views on gender, psy-
chology, and the law shaped one another in the immediate af-
termath of World War II, hampering women’s property rights 
and efforts to achieve constitutional equality. More than just a 
problematic precedent, the case exposes a world in which the 
“Champion Man-Hater of All Time”—newspapers’ epithet for 
Strittmater—was not only a humorous headline but also a cred-
ible threat to the postwar order that courts were helping to erect. 
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School; Ph.D. Student, Stanford University Depart-
ment of History. For their support and suggestions, I am grateful to Rabia Belt, Jen-
nifer Burns, James Campbell, Estelle Freedman, Barbara Fried, Allyson Hobbs, and 
Norman Spaulding, as well as the participants in Stanford’s U.S. History and Legal 
Studies workshops. Thank you also to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Gender 
& Law for the energy and expertise that they brought to this Article.
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The Article thus challenges the textbook understanding of “insane 
delusion” and shows that postwar culture was conducive to a 
strengthening of the longstanding suspicion that feminist cri-
tiques of gender inequality were, simply put, crazy.
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Introduction
In re Strittmater’s Estate1 is a mainstay of law school syllabi and 
treatises on property and trusts and estates.2 Legions of law students 
1. In re Stritmatter’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947).
2. I encountered the case in my first-year property law class at Stanford Law School, 
which assigned CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 581-83
(2d ed. 1985). The case is also referenced in numerous editions of Jesse Dukeminier’s
classic textbook, Wills, Trusts, and Estates. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 142-44 (3d ed. 1984); JESSE DUKEMINIER 
& STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 145-47 (5th ed. 1995); JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 159-61 (6th ed. 
2000); see also STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 400
(5th ed. 2015). Several major legal treatises also cite Strittmater. See, e.g., 79 AM. JUR.
2d Wills § 81 n.6, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020). Numerous law school syl-
labi assign Strittmater as the only or one of several cases exemplifying the insane delu-
sion doctrine. See, e.g., Keith Davidson & Stewart Albertson, Chapman University 
School of Law, Wills & Trusts: Fall 2014 Course Syllabus 4 (2014), 
https://www.aldavlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2014_Fall_Outline_Syll
_WILLS.pdf; Patricia Hoke, Southern Illinois University, Syllabus: Trusts & Estates 
5 (2012), https://law.siu.edu/_common/documents/courses/fa12-syllabi/trusts-
estates.pdf; Nancy Knauer, Temple University Beasley School of Law, Syllabus: 
Wills, Trusts, & Estates 4 (2013), https://silo.tips/download/syllabus-wills-trusts-
estates-100-250-t-th-spring-2013.
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have studied the 1947 decision from New Jersey’s highest court. The 
case is presented as a model of the “insane delusion” doctrine—one of 
the grounds on which a snubbed party can challenge a decedent’s capac-
ity to author a will.3 Students learn that Louisa Strittmater was an ec-
centric New Jersey landlady who in 1944 left her estate to the National 
Woman’s Party (NWP) to further the fight for the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA).4 Upon her death, estranged relatives quickly sur-
faced to challenge the bequest, contending that Strittmater’s intense 
commitment to women’s rights indicated mental incapacity.5 The court 
ultimately invalidated her will, agreeing that her views amounted to 
“feminism to a neurotic extreme” and that her “paranoiac condition, es-
pecially her insane delusions about the male” motivated her choice of 
beneficiary.6 The casebooks and treatises that cite Strittmater offer no 
commentary or context on its overt sexism, let alone the dramatic shift 
in perceptions of gender taking place at the time of the decision.7 New 
Jersey courts, which have continued to cite Strittmater as good law as re-
cently as 2014, are guilty of the same omission.8
This is troubling. Strittmater should be a well-known case, but not 
for the proposition that feminism is an insane delusion. In the first half 
of the 1940s, while the nation was at war, women like Louisa 
Strittmater gained opportunities on the home front and made strides 
toward constitutional equality.9 However, in the war’s wake, the coun-
try reversed course, championing domesticity and deeming some wom-
en who resisted “insane.”10 The life of Louisa Strittmater and the litiga-
3. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
275-77 (9th ed. 2013) (presenting Strittmater as the principal case for the “insane de-
lusion” unit).
4. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205; see also JANE MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 8-
19 (1986) (chronicling the NWP’s introduction of and advocacy for the Equal Rights 
Amendment).
5. Strittmater, 53 A.2d. at 205.
6. Strittmater, 53 A.2d. at 205-06.
7. See sources cited supra note 2.
8. See In re Estate of Malone, No. A-6147-12T2, 2014 WL 5712975, at *6 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Nov. 6, 2014) (relying on Strittmater for the proposition that “the ca-
veator must establish lack of capacity at the time that the will was executed”). Recent-
ly, some legal historians have exposed modern courts’ practice of routinely citing cas-
es that codify ugly histories. Many courts, for instance, have consistently invoked 
nineteenth-century property disputes without acknowledging that the property in 
dispute was an enslaved person. See Justin Simard, Citing Slavery, 72 STAN. L. REV.
79, 81-82, 97-99 (2020). Citing Strittmater without context reinforces the sort of 
gender bias that its namesake and the NWP strove to combat.
9. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
10. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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tion over her estate embody this ignoble turning point in modern Amer-
ican history. The case shows that postwar law and culture were condu-
cive to a strengthening of the longstanding suspicion that feminist cri-
tiques of gender inequality were, simply put, crazy.
Most of what we know of Louisa Strittmater appears in the court’s 
records. The dispute over her $15,000 estate produced more than two-
hundred pages of briefs and testimony.11 Although the record is rich, the 
evidence is decidedly biased. The caveators—the relatives who chal-
lenged the will—had a strong incentive to select the most outlandish ev-
idence and provocative witnesses, such as a female friend with whom 
Strittmater may have had an affair.12 We know that Strittmater kept a 
journal, but the only excerpts that survive are those that the caveators 
found in her secretary and introduced in court.13 Witnesses’ statements 
were also partial, guided by their own social backgrounds and con-
straints.14 To excavate a fuller and more balanced account of 
Strittmater’s story, this Article admits additional evidence, augmenting 
the court record with NWP archives, newspapers, census data, and sec-
ondary sources. Strittmater lived a modest life, but she managed to 
weave together a notable cast of characters, including antifeminist fe-
male psychologists,15 prominent New Jersey jurists and politicians,16 Al-
ice Paul and the feminists of the NWP,17 and even civil rights leaders 
like W.E.B. Du Bois.18
Despite Strittmater’s popularity among law professors and practi-
tioners, no scholar has interrogated the case’s broader historical back-
ground or its namesake’s story.19 A few have written on how inheritance 
11. See Judge Says She Was Crazy, DECATUR DAILY REV., Sept. 6, 1946, at 30 (highlight-
ing the amount in controversy); In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947) 
(No. 214) [hereinafter STRITTMATER RECORD] (collection of case records compiled 
in N.J. Court of Errors & Appeals, vol. 1825 (1947)).
12. See infra notes 259-70 and accompanying text.
13. See Testimony of Ruth Robbins, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 47.
14. See, e.g., Testimony of Helen Morse, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 52-
64 (explaining her tenancy in Strittmater’s home as a single mother and disavowing 
any sympathies to the feminist agenda).
15. See infra notes 204-21 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
19. See Kristen K. Tiscione, In re Strittmater’s Estate 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947), in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TRUSTS AND ESTATES OPINIONS 26, 26-38
(Deborah S. Gordon, Browne C. Lewis & Carla Spivack eds., 2020). The Feminist 
Judgments series rewrites notable judicial decisions on issues of gender justice, and the 
recent volume on trusts and estates offers a feminist reassessment of Strittmater. “Jus-
tice” Tiscione’s opinion “exposes the deep misogyny driving” the 1947 decision and 
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law has entrenched racial and gender hierarchies, but many of these 
pieces examine more contemporary issues and tend to focus on the oth-
er strand of testamentary incapacity doctrine—“undue influence.”20
More generally, feminist legal scholarship on the post-suffrage era tends 
to center on constitutional issues stemming from the Nineteenth 
concludes that the court should have upheld Strittmater’s will. Lloyd Bonfield & 
Bridget J. Crawford, Commentary on In re Strittmater’s Estate, in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TRUSTS AND ESTATES OPINIONS, supra at 17-25. While 
they may help draw overdue attention to the case, the appellate exercise and at-
tendant commentary only draw from the court records and do not offer this Article’s
same engagement with other historical sources. The commentary concedes, “[t]he 
twenty-first century reader does surmise that there may be more information relevant 
to Strittmater’s personal story than the court record reveals.” Id. at 22. This Article 
provides the reader with that additional information. Previously, only a handful of 
other books and journal articles had ever referenced Strittmater, and their treatment is 
uniformly superficial. See id. at 17-25; Kevin Bennardo, The Madness of Insane Delu-
sions, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 601, 613-14 (2018); Joshua C. Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion 
in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. REV. 891, 910-12 (2017); Karen J. Sneddon, Not 
Your Mother’s Will: Gender, Language, and Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535, 1576 
n.225 (2015); Daniel Monk, The Pleasures and Perils of Inheritance, 15 STUD.
GENDER & SEXUALITY 239, 241 (2014); Amy Ronner, Does Golyadkin Really Have a 
Double? Dostoevsky Debunks the Mental Capacity and Insane Delusion Doctrines, 40 
CAP. U.L. REV. 195, 219-21 (2012); Amy Ronner, When Courts Let Insane Delusions 
Pass the Rational Basis Test: The Newest Challenge to Florida’s Exclusion of Homosexuals 
from Adoption, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12-14 (2010); Claire Steinberger, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The “Sanist” Factor—An Interdisciplinary Approach, 46 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 573, 577 (2003); Gregory Atkinson, Towards a Due Process Per-
spective in Conservatorship Proceedings for the Aged, 18 J. FAM. L. 819, 827 (1979); 
Edward S. Halsey, Insane Delusions Affecting Testamentary Capacity, 2 WYO. L.J. 84.
84 (1948). Lawrence M. Friedman’s comprehensive history of American inheritance 
law contains one paragraph on Strittmater. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD 
HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 98 (2009).
20. Veena Murthy’s analysis of state appellate-level decisions between 1986 and 1995 
reveals that judges were more than twice as likely to overturn wills executed by wom-
en than men. Veena K. Murthy, Undue Influence and Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doc-
trine or Indoctrination?, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 105, 111-14 (1997). For a histor-
ical perspective on race and sex in estate law in the nineteenth century, see Adrienne 
D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 221, 225 (1999) (highlighting “the role of private law in negotiating and recon-
ciling what sometimes appear to be contradictory imperatives of preserving private 
property and maintaining racial hierarchy”). Another line of scholarship looks at 
“undue influence” charges brought against bequests between same-sex partners. See, 
e.g., Brian Alan Ross, Undue Influence and Gender Inequity, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REV. 97 (1997); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator,
42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (1981). 
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Amendment, rather than on private law and local disputes with more 
tangible consequences.21
Historian Lauren MacIvor Thompson’s work, which examines the 
intersection of law, psychology, and gender in the Gilded Age and Pro-
gressive Era, is exceptional. “Triangulating” court records, medical texts, 
and the writings of feminist reformers, Thompson shows that the day’s 
prevailing medical opinions, which cast women as innately unreasonable 
and susceptible to mental illness, weighed on women’s legal status.22
However, she argues, many judges temporarily set aside psychological 
rationales for sexism in the name of expanding the pool of productive 
economic actors and ruled for women.23 “Triangulating” legal, medical, 
and activist sources from 1920 to 1950, this Article draws on Thomp-
son’s method but departs from her period and her argument. Strittmater
suggests either that the respect for women’s reason and property rights, 
which Thompson ascribes to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
centuries, was hollow or that some courts’ positions shifted significantly 
in the mid-1940s.
While Strittmater was undoubtedly eccentric, her case is archetyp-
al. As Jill Lepore has written, microhistories are founded on the proposi-
tion that “however singular a person’s life may be, the value of examin-
ing it lies not in its uniqueness, but in its exemplariness, in how that 
individual’s life serves as an allegory for broader issues affecting the cul-
ture as a whole.”24 This microhistory illustrates how social views on 
gender, psychology, and the law shaped one another in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, hampering women’s property rights and 
their efforts to achieve constitutional equality. Part I traces how the legal 
drama of In re Strittmater’s Estate unfolded, and Part II uncovers the de-
tails of Strittmater’s life that the court record omitted or obscured. 
21. See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN 
AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion 
of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the 
Nineteenth Amendment, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 185 (1998); Gretchen Ritter, 
Gender and Citizenship After the Nineteenth Amendment, 32 POLITY 345 (2000); Reva 
Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002).
22. Lauren MacIvor Thompson, “The Reasonable (Wo)man”: Physicians, Freedom of Con-
tract, and Women’s Rights, 1870-1930, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 771, 782-85 (2018).
23. Id. at 776.
24. Jill Lepore, Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography,
88 J. AM. HIST. 129, 133 (2001). In teasing out the differences between the two his-
torical styles, Lepore also posits that the presence of a judgmental outsider—often a 
literal judge—is a distinguishing feature of microhistory. See id. at 139. This Article, 
featuring several judges as characters, is another data point proving her proposition.
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While traditional legal pedagogy might exclude such broader back-
ground, Part III spotlights four intersections between law and society 
crucial to understanding the period and Strittmater’s place within it: (A) 
women’s property rights; (B) the status of constitutional gender equality 
at the federal and state levels; (C) the rise of popular psychology applied 
to women’s mental state; and (D) the policing of sexual behavior. Read 
in these contexts, Louisa Strittmater’s life and legacy expose the historic 
conflation of feminism and mental illness and challenge the textbook 
understanding of “insane delusion.”
I. IN RE STRITTMATER’S ESTATE
Soon after Louisa Strittmater passed away in 1944, her estranged 
relatives—one uncle and two cousins—filed caveats to challenge the will
in the Essex County Orphan’s Court.25 All three had reasons to covet 
Strittmater’s assets: Ruth Robbins was a young mother of three,26 Fran-
cis Strittmater had been drafted into World War II,27 and Martin 
Strittmater was an elderly laborer still lodging in others’ homes.28 In the 
hopes of receiving the estate as her next of kin, they contended that 
Strittmater lacked the mental capacity to author a will.29 News of the 
caveators’ challenge caught the attention of the NWP’s Executive 
25. The first cousins, Martin Strittmater and Ruth Robbins, filed their complaint on De-
cember 11, 1944. See Caveat, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 1-2. Uncle 
Francis officially joined the suit on June 21, 1945. Id.
26. Ruth Mae Strittmater married Vincent Robbins and, by the age of twenty-two, had 
three children, ages one, five, and seven. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, NEW JERSEY, S.D. 
No. 1, E.D. No. 17-27, Sheet No. 10A (1940). Although Strittmater bequeathed 
some personal effects to her, Ruth evidently thought she deserved more. See Last Will 
and Testament of Louisa F. Strittmater, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 
3-4; Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 5.
27. Francis Strittmater of Wilkensburg, Pennsylvania was drafted into the military in 
1942 at the age of forty. See U.S. SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., D.S.S. FORM 1, Francis 
Strittmater Serial No. 2095, Order No. 10704.
28. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1940, NEW JERSEY, S.D. No. 1, E.D. No. 17-3, Sheet No. 1A 
(1940). In 1930, Martin had been residing with a different family and working as a 
laborer for a dairy farm. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, NEW JERSEY, S.D. No. 13, E.D. 
No. 17-23, Sheet No. 5A (1940).
29. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 5.
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Council, and the party engaged Laurence Semel, who had been 
Strittmater’s attorney, to defend the bequest.30
The trial court that first reviewed Strittmater’s estate in the sum-
mer of 1945 acted according to custom and upheld her will.31 The Advi-
sory Master, who oversaw the trial and wrote the initial decision, relied 
on an oft-cited New Jersey case, Smith v. Smith (1891), that articulated 
a stringent standard for “insane delusion” that was typical across the 
United States.32 Upholding the will of a man who maintained that his 
lawful wife was not actually his spouse, the Smith court decreed, “A de-
lusion is the mind’s spontaneous conception and acceptance of that, as a 
fact, which has no real existence except in its imagination, and its persis-
tent adherence to it against all evidence.”33 Quoting Smith, the Advisory 
Master hesitated to label Strittmater’s beliefs as delusions.34 Drawing a 
distinction from medical meanings of insanity, he emphasized “that the 
law sustains a will made by one of a very low or a very moderate meas-
ure of capacity.”35 While characterizing Strittmater as “neurotic, eccen-
tric, sexually perverted, irritable, occasionally violent and at times undu-
ly suspicious,” the Advisory Master concluded that her views on men 
were not “so constructed out of unrealities adhered to against all reason, 
as to constitute, in a technical sense, an insane delusion.”36 He implied 
that radical views on social change and animus toward the opposite sex 
were no reason to disrespect the deceased.37
The higher courts disagreed. Highlighting witness descriptions of 
Strittmater as a sex-crazed spinster, the appellate judge overturned her 
30. National Woman’s Party, Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Council (Feb. 4, 
1945), in NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS, pt. 002614, ser. 115, no. 0375, at 1 
(ProQuest History Vault), https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002614-
115-0375&accountid=14667 (login required); Letter from Burnita Shelton Mat-
thews to Laurence Semel (Dec. 16, 1944), in NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS,
pt. 002611, ser. 084, no. 0004, at 5 (ProQuest History Vault), https://congressional.
proquest.com/histvault?q=002611-084-0004&accountid=14667 (login required).
31. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 14.
32. Smith v. Smith, 25 A. 11 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1891). For an example of a subsequent 
application of the Smith standard, see In re Estate of McDowell, 143 A. 325 (N.J. 
1928). Even if other states had their own most-cited precedents, the Smith rule was 
quite typical, since most states’ standards contained a clause defining an insane delu-
sion as an acceptance of fact with no evidence to support it. Halsey, supra note 19, at 
84-85.
33. Smith, 25 A. 11 at 12. 
34. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 5.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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will on September 11, 1946.38 In a 10-2 per curiam opinion issued on 
May 15, 1947, New Jersey’s highest court affirmed and transferred the 
estate to the rebuffed relatives.39 The decision resolved, “The evidence 
does not show that she had taken great interest in [the NWP]. . . . [I]t 
was her paranoiac condition, especially her insane delusions about the 
male, that led her to leave her estate to the [NWP]. The result is that 
the probate should be set aside.”40 Without citing a single case, the 
judges diverged sharply from precedent and imposed an exceptionally 
high measure of capacity.41 Quirks that the trial judge had overlooked 
became critical character flaws in the eyes of the appellate courts. 
Reevaluating Strittmater’s “inward life,” these courts recast the dece-
dent’s fierce independence and overt sexuality as evidence of her insani-
ty.42 From the judges’ perspectives, Strittmater’s insistence on being an 
economic actor seemingly made her a threat, rather than an asset, to so-
ciety. The relatives, who struck out in 1945, prevailed in 1947, leaving 
the NWP with “a lawyer[’]s bill and no legacy.”43
The final disposition of Strittmater’s case represented a notable 
break from precedent. Throughout American history, courts have prized 
independence and private property and typically respected individuals’ 
right to assign their own assets in death, thus dismissing the majority of 
insane delusion claims.44 Even when courts have regarded wills as “devi-
ant,” in that they assert personal preferences contrary to the default stat-
utory norm, respect for free will has usually carried the day.45 For the 
38. Decree Reversing Decree of Orphans’ Court, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 
11, at 26.
39. In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205, 206 (N.J. 1947). The two justices in favor of 
reversal, Frederic R. Colie and Harold B. Wells, did not publish a dissenting opinion. 
Id. Wells had served on the court since 1930, and Colie had joined in 1941. See
Among the Alumni, 30 PRINCETON ALUMNI WKLY. 572, 573 (1930) (commending 
Wells’s appointment); Frederic R. Colie is Dead; Former New Jersey Judge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 1974, at 32 (identifying the years of Colie’s service), https://
www.nytimes.com/1974/06/01/archives/frederic-r-colie-is-dead-former-new-jersey-
judge.html [https://perma.cc/W72V-GTFQ].
40. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 206.
41. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 206; see also Prerogative Court Memorandum, in 
STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, 22-24.
42. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 206.
43. Letter from Leslie Black to Burnita Shelton Matthews (May 4, 1945), in NATIONAL 
WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS, pt. 02611, ser. 086, no. 0004, at 62 (ProQuest History 
Vault), https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002611-086-0004&account
id=14667 (login required).
44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 91.
45. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235 
(1996); see generally Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the 
Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
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same reason, courts have historically been extremely unreceptive to in-
sane delusion claims.46 While medical testimony grew more professional 
with the development of the field of psychology in the nineteenth cen-
tury, judges still continued to uphold personal choices and overlook ev-
idence of mental illness, setting a high bar for testamentary incapacity.47
Earlier cases in which state courts upheld bequests to feminist caus-
es reveal just how unusually searching the courts’ analysis of 
Strittmater’s motives was.48 Even when a will dispute involved feminist 
activism, courts typically required only a minimal showing of sanity to 
defeat a charge of delusion. For instance, in 1909, an Illinois court up-
held a woman’s bequest to the Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
(WCTU), citing evidence that the deceased was an upstanding, church-
going married lady.49 In Kansas, six years later, slighted sons failed to 
overturn their father’s gift to the WCTU by questioning the sanity of 
his greater “confidence in an institution managed by women than in an 
institution managed by men.”50 Meanwhile, in Iowa, a court found a 
father’s fiercely anti-suffragist views insufficient grounds to overturn his 
will, which coldly excluded his daughters.51 No three Midwestern cases 
could be representative of an entire period of American legal history, but 
they do show that support for women’s activism (or intense antagonism 
to it) had not always been a recipe for invalidation, at least if the de-
ceased was a man or a “respectable” lady.
Given this legal tradition, even eccentric individuals like Louisa 
Strittmater had good reason to expect that courts would honor their 
posthumous wishes. She was undeniably unconventional, but her oddity 
should not have amounted to insanity in the eyes of a court. New Jer-
sey’s appellate judges, however, summarily ignored settled practice and 
959 (2006) (excavating how early American judges parsed eccentricity from insanity 
while heeding the national ideal of personal autonomy).
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 91.
47. Blumenthal, supra note 45, at 179-81. For more on the relationship between law and 
psychology in the nineteenth century, see generally SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND: CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN 
LEGAL CULTURE (2016); JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993).
48. On Westlaw, I sifted through state court cases between 1900 and 1950 by using 
combinations of search terms such as “insane delusion,” “feminism,” “suffrage,”
“temperance,” and “equal rights.” I then focused my analysis on a few dozen results 
that involved a testamentary capacity dispute and contested views on women’s status. 
The three cases discussed, while typical in their outcomes, stand out for their depth 
of discussion of gender and testamentary capacity.
49. Drum v. Capps, 88 N.E. 1020, 1021, 1029 (Ill. 1909).
50. Wisner v. Chandler, 147 P. 849, 857 (Kan. 1915).
51. Kerkhoff v. Monkemeier, 175 N.W. 762, 766-67 (Iowa 1920).
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established a standard for “insane delusion” that welcomed scrutiny of 
the deceased’s popularity, politics, and adherence to social mores. Yet, 
even if such an exhaustive character study was to be the new normal, the 
portrait of Strittmater that they painted was far from complete. The fol-
lowing section uncovers the facts of her life that the courts failed to find.
II. Strittmater’s Life
Louisa Frances Strittmater was born in 1896 in New Jersey to 
German immigrants, Joseph and Josephine.52 Joseph’s job as a warper in 
the silk works industry provided his wife and only child with a relatively 
comfortable life, and he sent his daughter to school until at least the age 
of fourteen.53 During Louisa’s youth, the family of three lived in various 
rented apartments in Paterson, but, by 1923, they purchased a house at 
14 Dodd Street in Bloomfield, closer to Newark and routes to Manhat-
tan.54 Not long after, in 1925, Strittmater joined the NWP.55 After her 
parents died—Josephine in 1926, and Joseph in 1928—the house be-
came hers, and she lost contact with most of her extended family.56
The house was far from glamorous, but Strittmater took in lodgers 
as a means to sustain herself without needing to marry or seek outside 
employment.57 The building contained four flats: Two had their own 
52. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1900, NEW JERSEY, S.D. No. 3, E.D. No. 150, Sheet No. 19 
(1900) [hereinafter 1900 CENSUS].
53. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1910, NEW JERSEY, S.D. No. 178, E.D. No. 145, Sheet No. 14A 
(1910) [hereinafter 1910 CENSUS].
54. See 1900 CENSUS, supra note 52; 1910 CENSUS, supra note 53; BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1920, NEW JERSEY, S.D. No. 7, E.D. No. 125, Sheet No. 13B (1920); BLOOMFIELD,
N.J., U.S. CITY DIRECTORY 837 (1923).
55. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 11.
56. INDEX OF DEATHS IN NEW JERSEY, BLOOMFIELD, N.J., OCT. 1926 (Josephine 
Strittmater); INDEX OF DEATHS IN NEW JERSEY, BLOOMFIELD, N.J., OCT. 1928 (Jo-
seph Strittmater). The court record repeatedly references Strittmater’s isolation from 
extended family. See, e.g., Testimony of Ruth Robbins, in STRITTMATER RECORD, su-
pra note 11, at 42 (describing the small size of the surviving Strittmater family and 
the infrequency of her visits with her cousin). When asked, sometime around 1940, 
“Haven’t you any relatives?” Strittmater replied, “They are not interested in me.”
Testimony of Mildred V. Palmer, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 128. 
For the dates of Strittmater’s NWP membership, see id. at 130-33.
57. See Testimony of Frederick Weber, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 142.
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bathrooms, and the other two shared a toilet in the cellar.58 Even if she 
could not offer much in the way of luxury, Strittmater was able to se-
cure a steady stream of boarders.59 To maximize the number of tenants, 
Strittmater resided in the attic.60 The house was filled with books.61 As 
Frederick Weber, president of the local Landlords Information and Pro-
tective Association, testified, “She had several book cases filled with 
books. . . . She would have books open when you get there, she would 
be reading at the time; she would just have a book in her hand when 
you could come in.”62 Studious and frugal, Strittmater also unapologeti-
cally defied the era’s standards for femininity. Neighbors gossiped as she 
stubbornly took care of her own plumbing, wallpapering, and paint-
ing.63 Despite her efforts, the house fell into disrepair toward the end of 
her life, becoming “truly a ramshackle building,” as an NWP repre-
sentative observed.64 Still, in the surge of postwar housing development, 
the land itself remained valuable as a potential site for an apartment 
complex.65 At death, Strittmater’s assets amounted to $15,000—more 
than $220,000 in today’s dollars.66
58. Letter from Leslie Black to Anita Pollitzer (Nov. 1, 1945), in NATIONAL WOMAN’S
PARTY PAPERS, pt. 2612, ser. 088, no. 0147 at 8 (ProQuest History Vault), 
https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002612-088-0147&accountid=
14667 (login required).
59. In 1940, for instance, Strittmater was sharing her home with four boarders—two 
married couples. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH 
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, BLOOMFIELD, ESSEX COUNTY, N.J., S.D. 
No. 10, E.D. No. 7-59, Sheet No. 63A (1940). Two different former tenants, Helen 
F. Morse and Ida M. Whitson, testified at trial. See Caveat, in STRITTMATER RECORD,
supra note 11, at 52-69.
60. Letter from Leslie Black to Anita Pollitzer, supra note 58. Relying upon the income 
of boarders, Strittmater was part of a long tradition of landladies, some of whom 
faced stigma for commercializing the domestic sphere and, allegedly, fostering dens of 
vice. See Nicole M. Martin, In the Name of the Home: The Politics of Gender, Race, 
and Reconstruction in Nineteenth-Century America 164-70 (Aug. 2018) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author).
61. Testimony of Frederick Weber, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 148.
62. Id.
63. See Judge Says She Was Crazy, supra note 11, at 8; Caveat, in STRITTMATER RECORD,
supra note 11, at 63, 69, 73, 136 (relaying Strittmater’s handy(wo)man practices).
64. Letter from Leslie Black to Anita Pollitzer, supra note 58. 
65. In her letter assessing the value of 14 Dodd Street, Leslie Black anticipated that 
“someday apartments might go up there.” Id. Apartments were never built on 
Strittmater’s lot, but a Google Maps search reveals that the Garden State Parkway 
went up just a few doors down in the 1950s. Then adjacent to a highway overpass, 
the building likely became increasingly unglamorous.
66. See Judge Says She Was Crazy, supra note 11. The value of the estate in 2021 was es-
timated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI Inflation Calculator, 
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (enter “$15,000.00” for the dollar amount; set
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Strittmater was cautious with her finances. Weber favorably de-
scribed Strittmater as “businesslike” in her dealings with tenants.67 Ei-
ther through rents, inheritance, or a combination, she was able to amass 
a sizable collection of gold coins.68 When President Roosevelt an-
nounced the abolition of the gold standard in 1933, Strittmater was re-
luctant to surrender her savings.69 She placed a portion, around $870, in 
a Bloomfield bank, but she kept most buried in her basement.70 As a 
single woman surviving the Great Depression, Strittmater was likely 
anxious to protect her financial security. Neighbors offered an alterna-
tive explanation, telling the press that “she hoarded her money because 
she could not find a bank run by a woman.”71 On this account, the 
neighbors’ claims may have held some truth.
When it came to medical care—a much more intimate interface 
than banking—Strittmater did express an aversion to men and com-
mitment to women practitioners. Beginning in 1923, she retained a 
woman doctor, Sara D. Smalley.72 A former alumnae association presi-
dent of the New York Medical College and Hospital for Women, the 
Newark-based physician had considerable clout within her profession 
and experience in general practice and gynecology.73 Whether compelled 
by a previous traumatic experience or purely by principle, Strittmater’s 
insistence on women practitioners was provocative and potentially dan-
gerous at a time when the medical profession admitted so few women.74
On one occasion in 1939, Strittmater consulted her physician about a 
“December” and “1944” as the first date and “January” and “2021” as the second 
date; then click calculate).
67. Testimony of Frederick Weber, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 145.
68. Testimony of Jane M. Beech, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 189. In her 
Last Will and Testament, Strittmater specifically directed “the gold coins which 
[we]re in [her] house and all of [her] books” to the NWP. See Caveat, in
STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 3.
69. Testimony of Jane M. Beech, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 189.
70. Testimony of George Davidson, Jr., in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, 170-
71.
71. Court Overrules Spinster’s Hate for Mere Males, COURIER-POST (Camden, N.J.), Aug. 
30, 1946, at 13.
72. Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 84-
85.
73. Id. at 84; AM. INST. HOMEOPATHY, TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION 
252 (1908).
74. By 1949, women comprised only 5.5% of medical school students and 6% of the 
physician workforce. STAFF CARE, WOMEN IN MEDICINE: A REVIEW OF CHANGING 
PHYSICIAN DEMOGRAPHICS 2 (2015); see also MARY ROTH WALSH, “DOCTORS 
WANTED: NO WOMEN NEED APPLY”: SEXUAL BARRIERS IN THE MEDICAL 
PROFESSION, 1834-1975 (1977).
88 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:75
serious arm injury.75 Dr. Smalley, who was about to travel to Guatema-
la, recommended a male orthopedic specialist.76 Allegedly, Strittmater 
was furious and “berated [Dr. Smalley] very badly for having to leave 
her with a man at that time.”77
The few pieces of Strittmater’s writing that survive express her frus-
tration with society’s complacency toward men’s malevolence.78 For in-
stance, tucked into the pages of a book, Strittmater’s survivors found the 
handwritten instructions: “Do not let any man, in case of accident, pre-
tend that he is my husband or friend or in any way related or connected 
with me personally.”79 Strategically selected by the caveators, these in-
cendiary quotes may not be representative of Strittmater’s typical senti-
ments, but, together with her relationship to Dr. Smalley, they do indi-
cate a deep-seated distrust of the opposite sex.
Recognizing and resenting men’s power, Strittmater seems to have 
embraced occasional opportunities to pass as a man.80 Beginning in the 
1930s, American newspapers and magazines reported on stories of “sex 
changes” and “sex reversals.”81 Although the terms “transgender” and 
“transsexual” did not appear in the United States before 1949, individu-
als like Pauli Murray clearly experimented with gender and sexual iden-
tities before and during Strittmater’s lifetime, through dress, naming, 
75. Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 85.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 7-9.
79. John F. Hinternhoff, Champion Man-Hater of All Time, ST. LOUIS GLOBE-
DEMOCRAT, Oct. 23, 1946, at 11.
80. The evidence is not strong enough to indicate that Strittmater was transgender in the 
modern and strict sense of decisively crossing the gender line. Instead, Strittmater’s
androgynous actions are more consistent with Susan Stryker’s broad interpretation of 
the term, as “the movement across a socially imposed boundary away from an uncho-
sen starting place.” SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 1 (2008). On midcen-
tury transgender history, see id. at 41-50. On the continuing evolution in transgender 
concepts and terms, see SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 1-44 (2d ed., 
2017). I take inspiration from Rosalind Rosenburg’s treatment of Pauli Murray’s
nonbinary gender identity in her biographical study, especially the prefatory note on 
pronoun use. ROSALIND ROSENBURG, JANE CROW: THE LIFE OF PAULI MURRAY xvii
(2017). For the sake of clarity and consistency with my primary sources, which con-
sistently refer to Strittmater as “she,” I will use feminine pronouns throughout this 
Article. In this paragraph and the next, however, I consciously avoid using pronouns 
to disrupt the reader’s assumptions and respect Strittmater’s apparent desire to trans-
cend a rigid gender binary.
81. JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 15 (2004).
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and choice of romantic partners.82 Strittmater was constantly reflecting 
on and pushing against a rigid gender binary, through both personal 
behavior and political activism against gender-based discrimination. In 
1935, seemingly concerned about sexual identity, Strittmater consulted 
a psychologist and conducted a self-psychoanalysis soon after.83 As the 
court records explain, the analysis referred “to an incident she had had 
with a woman in 1929” and in it Strittmater “described herself as a 
‘pronounced psychic masochist’”—a term associated with homosexuali-
ty, at least in 1948.84 There is no indication that Strittmater continued 
to consult a psychologist, but Strittmater did decide to enroll in psy-
chology classes at Columbia University sometime between 1939 and 
1941.85
When others gendered Strittmater as male, Strittmater did not cor-
rect them. In 1940, Strittmater had “hair cut very short,” and an NWP 
colleague recommended growing it out to look more feminine.86
Strittmater may have been sporting this boyish cropped cut when the 
census taker appeared at 14 Dodd Street.87 The 1940 U.S. Census lists 
Louisa F. Strittmater, head of household and landlord to four tenants, 
as male.88 The crystal clear “M” mark suggests this was not a mere 
scrivener’s error.89 Still more telling, an “X” designation appears after 
Strittmater’s name, which indicates that the respondent furnished their 
own information, so Strittmater may have been the one who reported 
the masculine designation.90 A final example appears in an exchange 
with W.E.B. Du Bois, in which Strittmater signed off, “L.F. 
82. See ROSENBURG, supra note 80, at 31-60; LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND 
TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 
42-45 (1991); JEN MANION, FEMALE HUSBANDS 231-57 (2020) (arguing that oppor-
tunities for people assigned female to live as men and marry women grew sparser in 
American at the dawn of twentieth-century).
83. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 10.
84. Id. In his critique of Alfred Kinsey’s studies of homosexuality, Dr. Edmund Bergler 
accused “the homosexual” of “indulg[ing] in endless self-pity, unconsciously enjoying 
psychic masochism.” Edmund Bergler, The Myth of a New National Disease: Homo-
sexuality and the Kinsey Report, 22 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 66, 70-71 (1948).
85. Testimony of Mildred V. Palmer, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 128.
86. Id. at 130.
87. Id. at 130-31.
88. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 1940, BLOOMFIELD, ESSEX COUNTY, N.J., S.D. No. 10, E.D. No. 
7-59, Sheet No. 63A (1940).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Strittmater.”91 Du Bois assumed that his correspondent was male and 
addressed his reply to “Mr. Strittmater,” opening with the salutation 
“My dear sir.”92 Strittmater did not correct him in response and again 
signed off with initials.93 For Strittmater, embracing androgyny may 
have been a form of both self-protection and self-expression, a matter of 
convenience as well as a method of resistance.
These letters to Du Bois, which did not appear in the court record 
and have never before been cited, offer a rare account of Strittmater’s 
voice, unfiltered by the press or the caveators. They further show that 
Strittmater spent the 1930s reflecting both on her individual identity 
and on strategies for groups combatting discrimination. While many 
white feminists of her day—including the NWP—systematically ex-
cluded Black women and racial justice issues from their organizing ef-
forts,94 Strittmater engaged with civil rights discourse. She read The Cri-
sis magazine “regularly” and Du Bois’s books, The Souls of Black Folk 
(1903) and Darkwater (1920), “repeatedly.”95 There is much to admire 
about Du Bois’s Darkwater, but Strittmater might have especially ap-
preciated chapter seven, “The Damnation of Women.” In his ode to 
Black women and plea for all women’s liberation, Du Bois declared, 
91. Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois 3 (July 28, 1932) (on file with the 
Special Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i051.
92. Letter from W.E.B. Du Bois to L.F. Strittmater (Aug. 3, 1932) (on file with the Spe-
cial Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i052.
93. Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois (Apr. 4, 1932) (on file with the Spe-
cial Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i053.
94. According to Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor, “[i]ntegration never became a public is-
sue” for the NWP, unlike with the American Association of University Women, but 
they were far from welcoming of Black members, and “pursu[ed] a policy of isola-
tionism” when it came to racial justice and other social movements. LEILA RUPP &
VERTA TAYLOR, SURVIVAL IN THE DOLDRUMS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1945 TO THE 1960S 136, 156 (1987). Numerous writers have sought to 
expose how the women’s movement, before and after suffrage, has continued to side-
line women of color and intersectional concerns. See, e.g., Evelyn Brooks Hig-
ginbotham, African-American Women’s History and the Metalanguage of Race, 17 
SIGNS 251, 251-52, 255 (1992); Barbara Smith, Racism and Women’s Studies, in ALL
THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN: BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE 
71-73 (Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell-Scott & Barbara Smith eds., 1982); LOUISE 
MICHELE NEWMAN, WHITE WOMEN’S RIGHTS: THE RACIAL ORIGINS OF FEMINISM 
IN THE UNITED STATES 3-85 (1999); LISA TRETAULT, THE MYTH OF SENECA FALLS:
MEMORY AND THE WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1848-1898 19-45 (2014).
95. Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois 1 (July 28, 1932) (on file with the 
Special Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i051.
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“The future woman must have a life work and economic independence. 
She must have knowledge. She must have the right of motherhood at 
her own discretion.”96 Strittmater, a financially independent bibliophile 
who shirked motherhood, may have seen herself reflected in Du Bois’s 
words.
However, Strittmater did not grasp the parallels that Du Bois drew 
between race and sex discrimination. Reading his commentary on 
Booker T. Washington in The Souls of Black Folk, Strittmater ruminated 
on the infamous ideological tension between the two Black leaders.97 As 
boldly as she defied sex and gender norms, her views on race were more 
restrained, and she instinctively sided with Washington’s accommoda-
tionist strategy.98 Nevertheless, demonstrating characteristic moxie, 
Strittmater wrote directly to Du Bois in July 1932 to better understand 
his perspective and hopefully “receive a note of rebuttal.”99 The belit-
tling generalizations about “your own race” that she included quickly 
revealed her whiteness.100 She stated, “Your aim, if I interpret it correct-
ly, is not paramountly justice for the Negro, but rather vindication of 
the Negro.”101 Such “deliberate provocation and vindictiveness,” she as-
serted, was “reaching for the moon” and “mistaken zeal.”102 She con-
tended that interracial understanding had to be an incremental objec-
tive: “You cannot bully evolution, nor sentiment . . . . [I]t must be 
bought and paid for, like everything else; and the coin for its purchase, 
in the absence of power, is conciliation.”103 In his prompt rebuttal, Du
Bois did not budge: “Minority must always ‘vaunt its powers,’ other-
wise, it will lose what little power it has, and . . . if what I am writing in 
THE CRISIS comes under that head, you will, I regret to say, see as 
96. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DARKWATER 164-65 (1920).
97. See W.E.B. Du Bois, Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others, in THE SOULS OF 
BLACK FOLK 41 (1903); see also JACQUELINE M. MOORE, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON,
W.E.B. DU BOIS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL UPLIFT (2003) (offering a com-
prehensive survey of the debate between Du Bois and Washington); KEVERN 
VERNEY, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: BOOKER T. WASHINGTON AND BLACK 
LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1881-1925 (2001) (examining Washington’s
life and leadership philosophy in comparison with peers like Du Bois).
98. See Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois 1 (July 28, 1932) (on file with 
the Special Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Library), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i051. 
99. Id. at 3.
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much of it in the future as you have in the past.”104 Strittmater conceded 
little in her subsequent note and took particular issue with Du Bois’s in-
sistence that Black liberation required “standing up as men instead of 
crawling like animals.”105 Voicing her fundamental doubt in male supe-
riority, she wrote, “Standing up as men has no inherent virtue. Man-
hood, per se, is nothing to boast of. The question is, for what do those 
men stand?”106 Du Bois did not bite, and there is no record of further 
correspondence. This remarkable exchange reveals both Strittmater’s lu-
cidity and the limits of her liberalism.
While chastising Du Bois for his boldness on racial progress, she 
held views on gender equality that were anything but accommodation-
ist. When it came to women’s rights, she did not shy away from “provo-
cation and vindictiveness” or draw distinctions between “vindication” 
and “justice.”107 She advocated immediate, not incremental, change in 
the form of the ERA, and she regarded the NWP as the most promising 
agent for the cause. In a 1936 journal entry, she raged,
Not even women’s colleges enlighten women as to the vicious 
circle of deceptions, delusions and illusions that are foisted 
upon them concerning that dirty breed of leeches and para-
sites—the inveterate enemies of women—men—and it re-
mains for feministic organizations like the N.W.P. to make 
exposure of women’s ‘protectors’ and ‘lovers’ for what their 
vicious and contemptible selves are.108
In Strittmater’s view, achieving women’s liberation would require stud-
ied resistance to patriarchalism and a radical agenda for reform.109 By 
decade’s end, she had made the “feministic organization” more central 
to her life.
104. Letter from W.E.B. Du Bois to L.F. Strittmater (Aug. 3, 1932) (on file with the Spe-
cial Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i052.
105. Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois (Aug. 4, 1932) (on file with the Spe-
cial Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i053.
106. Id.
107. Letter from L.F. Strittmater to W.E.B. Du Bois 2 (July 28, 1932) (on file with the 
Special Collections & University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Li-
brary), https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b064-i051.
108. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 7.
109. See, e.g., id.
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Beginning in 1939, Strittmater made weekly commutes across the 
Hudson to volunteer for the NWP’s New York branch.110 She clipped 
press notices, filed, and typed—any administrative tasks that would ad-
vance the Party’s push for the ERA.111 In 1941, the head of the state 
branch wrote to the organization’s national executive secretary, “Louise 
[sic] Strittmater is one of our members in New Jersey who tries con-
stantly to work for the amendment . . . .”112 Strittmater maintained a 
“very quiet” presence in the New York office, but she did develop 
friendships with some of the other activists, discussing museum exhibits 
they had seen and even confessing her loneliness.113 Strittmater’s efforts 
extended beyond the office: She donated some of her book collection to 
110. Testimony of Mildred V. Palmer, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 126-
27. Strittmater had to journey to New York to volunteer because the local New Jersey 
branch, like many other state chapters, had shut down due to inactivity. See THE 
PIVOTAL RIGHT: COMMEMORATING THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WOMEN’S
RIGHTS CONVENTION AT SENECA FALLS 1, 18 (Fernanda Perrone & Ferris Olin, cu-
rators) (1998). Although Alice Paul, the Party’s founder, was originally from New 
Jersey, the Garden State branch had recently disbanded after several sluggish years, 
fading into extinction in the 1930s as the success of the Nineteenth Amendment re-
ceded and the National Woman’s Party turned toward federal advocacy for the Equal 
Rights Amendment. See id. While the NWP had focused on state-level advocacy in 
the 1920s, its agenda shifted in the following decade. See RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note
94, at 26. Active state branches remained in Maryland, New York, Ohio, and Cali-
fornia, but most of the action took place in Washington, D.C. Id. The remaining 
state branches primarily served a symbolic function, “as names on letterheads” used 
to reach out to senators and representatives. Id.
111. Testimony of Mildred V. Palmer, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 126-
27. Mildred V. Palmer, the former executive secretary of the New York NWP 
branch, testified on the party’s behalf at trial. Id. at 126-34. Palmer’s appearance was 
a strategic choice for the NWP: Not only was she one of the few notable members 
who had known Strittmater personally, but she also exuded a more conventional fem-
ininity than other potential NWP witnesses and had a bit of disinterested distance 
from the outcome. See id. at 126-27. During the war, Palmer had resigned her NWP 
position to serve as program director of the Stagedoor Canteen, so that she could be 
closer to her enlisted husband. Id. Palmer’s testimony should not necessarily be taken 
at face value, but, together with reference to Strittmater in the NWP’s archives, it 
suggests the sincerity and consistency of Strittmater’s interest in the party and its core 
cause.
112. Letter from Mildred V. Palmer to Caroline Babcock (Apr. 8, 1941), in NATIONAL 
WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS, pt. 2611, ser. 070, no. 0291, at 9 (ProQuest History 
Vault), https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002611-070-0291&account
id=14667 (login required).
113. Testimony of Mildred V. Palmer, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 128-
29; Letter from Leslie Black to Burnita Shelton Matthews, supra note 43.
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the NWP’s library and wrote to her congressional representatives to urge 
adoption of the ERA.114
As a stalwart NWP member, Strittmater was unusual among femi-
nists of her day. The NWP in the 1930s and 1940s represented a wan-
ing, elitist segment of women’s activism.115 An organization of 60,000 in 
the final years of the suffrage movement, the NWP’s membership had 
dropped to 4,000 by 1945.116 These remaining members were over-
whelmingly white, wealthy, and over fifty years old.117 With their elitism 
and single-issue focus, the NWP alienated other feminist organizations 
that doubted the ERA’s potential to improve women’s lives and that 
practiced intersectional activism, with an eye toward other dimensions 
of identity like race and class.118 Back in 1915, suffragist leader Anna 
Howard Shaw insisted, “The end aim of the suffrage movement is not 
114. Mary Elizabeth Downey, Florence Bayard Hilles Feminist Library, EQUAL RTS., July-
Aug. 1943, at 60; Letter from Mildred V. Palmer to Caroline Babcock, supra note 
112. The sense of community that the NWP provided may also have inspired 
Strittmater’s service. See Leila J. Rupp, The Women’s Community in the National 
Woman’s Party, 1945 to the 1960s, 10 SIGNS 715, 720-21 (1985).
115. RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 25-26.
116. Id. The ranks of “active” members—those who continued to pay annual dues rather 
than those who had enrolled with a flat fee—were even slimmer, down to 627 in 
1947. Id.
117. Rupp, supra note 114, at 719.
118. Many historians have shown the breadth of and conflicts within women’s activism 
between the “waves.” See, e.g., JACQUELINE CASTLEDINE, COLD WAR PROGRESSIVES:
WOMEN’S INTERRACIAL ORGANIZING FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (2012); DOROTHY 
SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA (2003); NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF 
MODERN FEMINISM (1987); DAYO F. GORE, RADICALISM AT THE CROSSROADS:
AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN ACTIVISTS IN THE COLD WAR (2011); CYNTHIA 
HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 1945-1968
(1988); SUSAN HARTMANN, THE HOME FRONT AND BEYOND: AMERICAN WOMEN 
IN THE 1940S (1982); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW:
BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 195-227
(2010); LISA LEVENSTEIN, A MOVEMENT WITHOUT MARCHES: AFRICAN AMERICAN 
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF POVERTY IN POSTWAR PHILADELPHIA (2009);
JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, NOT JUNE CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR 
AMERICA, 1945-1960 (1994); ROSENBURG, supra note 80; SUSAN WARE, BEYOND 
SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL (1981); KATE WEIGAND, RED FEMINISM:
AMERICAN COMMUNISM AND THE MAKING OF WOMEN’S LIBERATION (2001); Nancy 
F. Cott, Historical Perspectives: The Equal Rights Amendment Conflict in the 1920s, in
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 44 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); Jo-
anne Meyerowitz, Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Cul-
ture, 1946-1958, 79 J. AM. HIST. 1455 (1993); Susan Ware, American Women in the 
1950s: Nonpartisan Politics and Women’s Politicization, in WOMEN, POLITICS, AND 
CHANGE 281 (Louise A. Tilly & Patricia Gurin eds., 1990).
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to furnish an opportunity for excellent old ladies to be charitable.”119
Yet, in the decades to follow the Nineteenth Amendment’s adoption, 
feminist philanthropy remained relevant—the NWP continued to de-
pend upon the generosity of female funders like Alva Belmont—and the 
“excellent old ladies” held tight to their power, despite mounting oppo-
sition to their tactics.120
Louisa Strittmater, a woman who lived her life in extremes, may 
have been drawn to the contentiousness of the cause. Moreover, she 
planned her will during an unusually optimistic moment for the ERA. 
First introduced to Congress in 1923, the ERA floundered in its first 
decades, despite the NWP’s advocacy efforts.121 However, in 1940, the 
Republican Party adopted the ERA as part of its official platform, and 
the Democrats followed suit four years later.122 In 1942 and 1943, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee recommended the amendment, passing it 
onto the full chamber for the first time.123 Strittmater began contemplat-
ing her bequest as early as 1940, when she saw a suggestion to that effect 
119. Anna Howard Shaw, The Fundamental Principle of a Republic (June 21, 1915),
https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/21/the-fundamental-principle-of-a-
republic-june-21-1915/ [https://perma.cc/RPA6-QBUR]; see also COTT, supra note 
118, at 100.
120. Although she did not dare say so, Shaw was also likely eager to be out from under the 
thumb of big-name benefactors, like Alva Belmont, who expected deference and de-
votion in return for their financial support. On the influence Belmont wielded over 
the NWP, see JOAN MARIE JOHNSON, FUNDING FEMINISM: MONIED WOMEN,
PHILANTHROPY, AND THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 1870-1967 59-69 (2017). Contra-
ry to Shaw’s premonition, female funders, who had been central to the settlement 
house and suffrage movements, remained vital in the Nineteenth Amendment’s af-
termath, giving major gifts to feminist causes like higher education, labor activism, 
and birth control. See id. at 11, 79-138, 169-98; see also, e.g., Kathryn Kish Sklar, 
Who Funded Hull House?, in LADY BOUNTIFUL REVISITED: WOMEN, PHILANTHROPY,
AND POWER 94 (Kathleen McCarthy ed., 1990).
121. MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE 
AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 56-69 (1986).
122. MANSBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 9.
123. HARRISON, supra note 118, at 15-16. To overcome remaining opposition, especially 
in the House Judiciary Committee, proponents revised and renamed the proposal.
The History of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), ALICE PAUL INST.,
https://www.alicepaul.org/equal-rights-amendment-2/ [https://perma.cc/HDA2-
CGBX]. The original amendment had been a boldly affirmative proclamation: “Men 
and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place sub-
ject to its jurisdiction.” Id.; HARRISON, supra note 118, at 16. The new version read, 
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any state on account of sex.” ALICE PAUL INST., supra. The language echoed the 
remedial purposes of the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, which did not cre-
ate a constitutional right to vote but instead guaranteed that race and sex could not 
be impediments to the franchise.
96 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:75
in the NWP’s magazine, Equal Rights.124 The inspiring article was likely 
a March 1940 notice of Dr. Elizabeth Woodworth’s generous donation, 
encouraging “more women interested in the work Equal Rights is do-
ing . . . [to] back up their approval and their desire to help with a 
check . . . .”125 In July 1944, Strittmater wrote directly to Alice Paul to 
seek her advice on how best to fund “women’s activities designed to lib-
erate all women from invidious laws, customs and traditions.”126 She ex-
pressed her “inten[t] to make the N.W.P. beneficiary of a legal docu-
ment,” but she wanted Paul’s input on which “alternative feminist 
movement” to name in the event the “N.W.P. is dissolved by the time it 
becomes effective, because its work has been done, and its goal accom-
plished.”127
Although she was only forty-eight at the time, Strittmater must 
have sensed her health was declining rapidly and wanted to get her af-
fairs in order. By late October 1944, her stomach was engorged with a 
cancerous tumor the size of a “seven-and-a-half-month-old fetus.”128
When she learned that surgery was unavoidable, Strittmater officially 
drafted her will on October 31.129 To fund the fight for equal rights, she 
named the NWP as her executor and primary beneficiary.130 The cancer 
progressed rapidly, and she passed away on December 6, 1944.131
III. Postwar Pathologies of Strittmater’s Legacy
Strittmater’s death brought her estranged relatives out of the 
woodwork. Hearings began on May 3, 1945, just five days before the 
124. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 12.
125. Help Hasten the Day, EQUAL RTS., Mar. 1940, at 11.
126. Letter from Louisa Strittmater to Alice Paul (July 1, 1944), in NATIONAL WOMAN’S
PARTY PAPERS, pt. 2611, ser. 081, no. 0344, at 4 (ProQuest History Vault), 
https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002611-081-
0344&accountid=14667 (login required)..
127. Id. Florence Armstrong, chair of the NWP’s Finance Committee, replied on Paul’s
behalf, expressing their gratitude and suggesting as an alternative the World Wom-
an’s Party for Equal Rights, which Paul also chaired. Letter from Florence Armstrong, 
Finance Comm. Chair, to Louisa Strittmater (July 11, 1944), in NATIONAL 
WOMAN’S PARTY PAPERS, pt. 2611, ser. 081, no. 0451, at 67 (ProQuest History 
Vault), https://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=002611-081-0451&account
id=14667 (login required).
128. Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 86-
87, 92.
129. Testimony of Laurence Semel, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 163.
130. See Last Will and Testament of Louisa F. Strittmater, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra
note 11, at 3-4.
131. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 6.
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nation celebrated V-E Day.132 Two years later, in May 1947, the case 
reached New Jersey’s supreme bench.133 Their decision was final: Louisa 
Strittmater’s will would no longer stand.134
In the course of these few crucial years, gender norms came on trial 
outside of the courtroom, too. The legal drama unfolded against the 
backdrop of postwar demobilization, as veterans returned from overseas 
and the nation embraced a new vision of peacetime order and prosperi-
ty—often at women’s expense.135 An examination of the case’s broader 
setting renders Strittmater a revealing portrait of a particular historical 
moment when social mores were shifting at a rapid rate. As the subse-
quent Subparts explore in turn, changes in property law, constitutional 
rights, psychology, and sexuality fatefully shaped the case’s outcome. 
These broader contexts elucidate the appellate courts’ stark break from 
precedent, as well as how the legal system both fashioned and reinforced 
society’s views on the reasonableness of women’s equality in the imme-
diate aftermath of World War II.
A. Women & Wealth
The caveators twisted many mundane facts from Strittmater’s life 
into evidence of her madness, but few loomed larger than her mysteri-
ous collection of gold coins. When questioning the witnesses, the cavea-
tors’ counsel repeatedly returned to her mysterious trips to the base-
ment.136 One tenant, Helen Morse, testified, “she had a habit of going 
down in the cellar some time between twelve o’clock and three in the 
morning . . . going around with a flashlight.”137 These “midnight 
prowls,” Morse attested, “occurred quite frequently.”138 Morse’s mother, 
Ida, agreed: “She would come down the stairs and we always said, 
‘There goes Lizzie down on one of her prowls.’”139 The court fixated on 
132. Testimony, Essex County Orphan’s Court, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, 
at 32.
133. For an overview of the trial proceedings, see Letter from Leslie Black to Burnita Shel-
ton Matthews, supra note 43; In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947).
134. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 206.
135. See ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD 
WAR ERA 19-38 (1988).
136. See Testimony of Helen F. Morse, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 57
(direct examination); Testimony of Ida M. Whitson, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra
note 11, at 67 (same).
137. Testimony of Helen F. Morse, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 57.
138. Id.
139. Testimony of Ida M. Whitson, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 67.
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Strittmater’s miserly habits.140 In the caveators’ account, Strittmater’s 
relationship to her money was odd, disruptive, and out of step with her 
times, even before she made the irrational decision to donate to the 
NWP.
Strittmater came of age when American women had more robust 
rights to own and alienate property than ever before. Beginning in the 
mid-nineteenth century, states’ adoption of Married Women’s Property 
Acts eroded the convention of coverture and thus permitted wives to re-
tain their legal personhood and property rights.141 As important as the 
Nineteenth Amendment granting voting rights, expanding employment 
opportunities increased women’s earnings and assets.142 In her 1934 
study, Women and Wealth, Mary Sydney Branch celebrated first among 
women’s recent achievements that “Women can now make wills.”143
However, the mere right to draft a will did not necessarily mean 
the right to have the will respected and enforced in court. The judiciary 
remained male-dominated, and, even if a probate dispute made it before 
a jury, there were likely few women participants.144 As of 1947, sixteen 
states continued to exclude women as jurors, and fifteen of the thirty-
140. The court record repeatedly returns to discussion of Strittmater’s capacity to manage 
her own finances. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER 
RECORD, supra note 11, at 111; Testimony of Frederick Weber, in STRITTMATER 
RECORD, supra note 11, at 143.
141. See Bernie D. Jones, Revisiting the Married Women’s Property Acts: Recapturing Protec-
tion in the Face of Equality, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 91, 99-110 (2013) 
(summarizing the impact of nineteenth-century state statutes removing women’s legal 
and economic disabilities at common law); see also JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND 
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN app. 1 at 377-82 (1991) (listing nine-
teenth-century Married Women’s Property Acts); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The 
First Women’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 
YALE L.J. 1073, 1080-83 (1994) (examining nineteenth-century feminists’ push for 
property acts to account for the worth of women’s household labor).
142. See COTT, supra note 118, at 117-20; ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A
HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 217-99 (1982).
143. MARY SYDNEY BRANCH, WOMEN AND WEALTH 3 (1934).
144. Burnita Shelton Matthews, a primary participant in the NWP correspondence re-
garding Strittmater’s estate, became the first woman in U.S. history to serve as a fed-
eral district court judge, appointed in 1949. Burnita Shelton Matthews, ENCYC.
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Burnita-Shelton-Matthews
[https://perma.cc/V62G-P6S6]. A woman did not serve as a trial-level court judge in 
New Jersey until 1946, and the first woman was not appointed to the state’s highest 
court until 1982. Vicki Hyman, Trailblazing Female Murray Hill Lawyer, 70, Receives 
N.J. Bar Foundation’s Top Honor, NJ.COM (June 15, 2011), https://www.nj.com
/news/2011/06/70-year-old_lawyer_receives_nj.html [https://perma.cc/LHG2-
57RX]; Justice Marie L. Garibaldi, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (Jan. 18, 2016), 
https://obits.nj.com/obituaries/starledger/obituary.aspx?n=marie-l-garibaldi&pid=
177335917&fhid=11208 [https://perma.cc/448E-BMNS].
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two states that included women made service voluntary, meaning that 
they could opt-out without cause or consequence.145 Thus, even as 
women gained statutory privileges, persisting inequities in the justice 
system undercut their willpower.146 Strittmater lived at a time when 
women enjoyed expanded property rights and access, but she died at a 
moment in which the legal system was apparently primed to ridicule 
and reduce her economic independence. Appraising her financials—
ostensibly the core controversy—became pretext for indicting the ERA, 
which threatened to extend women’s economic independence even fur-
ther.
145. Marguerite J. Fisher, Women as Jurors: The Present Status of Women as to Jury Service,
33 A.B.A. J. 113, 114 (1947). Jury service was one of feminists’ main advocacy efforts 
after the vote was won. See Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship Be-
fore and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 479, 503-06 (2002). 
Ten states quickly held that the new Nineteenth Amendment conferred eligibility for 
jury service; reform in other states required statutory or state constitutional amend-
ments. Fisher, supra, at 114. By the 1940s, progress remained incremental, and New 
Jersey was one of only seventeen states that had compulsory jury service for women. 
Id. at 114 n.7. In the same year as Strittmater, the U.S. Supreme Court implied in 
Fay v. New York that the exclusion or underrepresentation of women on juries did 
not violate the Constitution. 332 U.S. 261, 289-90 (1947). In many cases, then, 
women litigants did not get the benefit—and, in criminal cases, the constitutional 
guarantee—of a jury of one’s peers. See also Richard F. Hamm, Mobilizing Legal Tal-
ent for a Cause: The National Woman’s Party and the Campaign to Make Jury Service 
for Women a Federal Right, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 97 (2001) (chroni-
cling the NWP’s jury service campaign in the 1920s and 1930s).
146. For a summary of women’s changing legal status in the 1940s, see HARTMANN, supra 
note 118, at 127-35. For a survey of gender inequity in family law of the early twen-
tieth century, see Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Over-
view of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth 
Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2019-48 (2000). As Kay discusses briefly, the post-
World War II years ushered in an era of divorce reform. Id. at 2040-48. While mar-
riage policy has traditionally been the purview of the states, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued several critical opinions in the 1940s that set national policies on “migratory”
divorce, alimony, and child support. See NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY 
OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 195 (2009). While statutory rape reform efforts had 
flourished prior to 1920, they became less successful and more suspect in the Nine-
teenth Amendment’s wake. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, REDEFINING RAPE: SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE ERA OF SUFFRAGE AND SEGREGATION 211-12 (2013). Sexual vio-
lence, especially the marital exemption for rape, “moved to the margins of the femi-
nist political agenda, where it would remain until the 1960s.” Id. at 211. Tax law also 
sharpened gender inequity. See Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: 
Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259, 273-74 (1988). On 
post-suffrage feminist legal reform efforts in New Jersey, in particular, see FELICE D.
GORDON, AFTER WINNING: THE LEGACY OF THE NEW JERSEY SUFFRAGISTS, 1920-
1947 (1986).
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B. The Reasonableness of Constitutional Equality
In challenging Strittmater’s parting gift, the caveators contended 
that constitutional gender equality was an unreasonable objective. At 
trial, the litigants paid special attention to her proclamation that it was 
the duty of “feministic organizations like the N.W.P. to make exposure 
of women’s ‘protectors’ and ‘Lovers’ for what their vicious and con-
temptible selves are.”147 To admit the evidence into the court record, 
one of the attorneys had Dr. Smalley read the passage aloud.148 Meant 
for only her own eyes, Strittmater’s diary handwriting was apparently 
poor, and the doctor stumbled over several passages.149 On first read, the 
doctor tellingly—and perhaps purposefully—misread the opening epi-
thet as “primitive organizations like the N.W.P.”150 When Strittmater’s 
attorney questioned her reading, she quickly corrected, “I am sorry. I 
can make an F out of that. ‘Feministic organizations.’”151 Such a disa-
greement about whether the NWP’s aims were fundamentally progres-
sive or barbaric shaped the entire adjudication. Although the appellate 
judge diminished Strittmater’s service to the NWP, remarking that 
Strittmater had never “taken great interest in it,” his assessment of her 
feminist strategy was part and parcel of his evaluation of her mental 
condition.152
As the case unfolded, the public debated the merits of the ERA, the 
relevance of the NWP, and the possibility of constitutional equality at 
the state level. Although the 1940s had begun optimistically for the 
ERA, support began to fade in the decade’s latter half.153 After receiving 
support from the major political parties and the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Congress finally voted on the ERA for the first time in 1946.154
However, the amendment fell just short in the Senate of the two-thirds 
majority needed for passage onto the states.155
The ERA’s prospects faded soon after this early-1940s highpoint. 
Formidable opponents within the broader feminist movement contrib-
uted to the ERA’s slow progress. While the ERA stood for absolute gen-
147. Brief of Caveators-Appellees, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 9.
148. Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 95-
98.
149. Id. at 96-97.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 97.
152. Prerogative Court Memorandum, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 24.
153. See HARRISON, supra note 118, at 22.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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der equality, social justice and labor feminists believed that some laws 
that stipulated differential gender treatment actually benefited wom-
en.156 They stressed that the ERA would outlaw protective labor legisla-
tion, thus threatening previous victories concerning women’s wages, 
hours, and working conditions.157 High-profile women, like Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Mary Anderson, director of the Women’s Bureau of the 
Department of Labor, publicly opposed the ERA.158 Organizations that 
embraced the maternalist reform tradition, like the National Consum-
ers’ League and National Women’s Trade Union League, also defended 
sex-based legislation, arguing that women’s roles as mothers merited dif-
ferential treatment under law and should be the basis of their social and 
political power.159 Amid postwar demobilization that threatened wom-
en’s economic advancement, progressive and maternalist reformers am-
plified their historical opposition to the NWP and its core cause.160 The 
conflict among feminist sects grew particularly acute in February 1947, 
when Congress considered the Women’s Status Bill—labor feminists’ 
counter to the ERA.161 The postwar era had just begun, but the NWP 
portended a looming regression. Proponents began to feel the same 
sense of urgency that Strittmater’s failing health had provoked in her. At 
year’s end, the NWP’s executive secretary, Caroline Babcock, pressed, 
“[We must pass the ERA] before the dreadful anti-feminist reaction we 
are facing closes all doors to us.”162 With party membership and con-
gressional support fading at World War II’s end, the NWP scrambled to 
sneak in a victory.163
156. COBBLE, supra note 118, at 59-60.
157. For a long history of sex-based labor legislation, see NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY
HERSELF: PROTECTIVE LAWS FOR WOMEN WORKERS, 1890S-1990S (2015).
158. See 2 BLANCHE WIESEN COOK, ELEANOR ROOSEVELT: 1933-1938, at 78 (1999);
Cott, supra note 118, at 48.
159. On the maternalist reform tradition, see BERRY, supra note 121, at 45-55; KATHRYN 
KISH SKLAR, FLORENCE KELLEY AND THE NATION’S WORK: THE RISE OF WOMEN’S
POLITICAL CULTURE, 1830-1900 206-36 (1995); Linda Gordon, Putting Children 
First: Women, Maternalism, and Welfare in the Early Twentieth Century, in U.S.
HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY 63, 67-86 (Linda K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris & 
Kathryn Kish Sklar eds., 1995); Rebecca DeWolf, The Equal Rights Amendment and 
the Rise of Emancipationism, 1932-1946, 38 FRONTIERS 47, 62-63 (2017).
160. See COBBLE, supra note 118, at 62-63.
161. Id. at 63.
162. RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 22 (quoting Caroline Babcock to Anna Kelton 
Wiley, Dec. 6, 1947).
163. NWP membership had reached 60,000 in the final years of the suffrage movement 
but dropped to 4,000 by 1945. RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 26. The Senate fi-
nally passed the ERA in 1950, but only because it included the controversial “Hay-
den Rider,” which provided that the ERA would “not be construed to impair any 
rights, benefits, or exemptions now or hereinafter conferred by law upon persons of 
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Internal feuding within the NWP, as its founding leaders turned 
over the reins, further weakened its influence. In 1947, NWP leaders 
hurt their own chances of success by literally closing the doors on a fac-
tion of fellow members.164 The NWP’s “1947 schism” was the climax of 
a long-standing conflict between those loyal to Alice Paul and followers 
of her rival, Doris Stevens.165 When Paul resigned as National Chairman 
in 1945, she hand-picked Anita Pollitzer as her replacement.166 Stevens 
bitterly opposed this favoritism and launched a coup to challenge the 
new regime.167 Pollitzer’s coalition responded by locking the insurgents 
out of the party’s Washington, D.C. headquarters.168 The Stevens clan 
filed suit in federal court to seek an injunction against their exclusion.169
The suit was unsuccessful, but the schism fostered further division 
among members and fueled newspapers’ representations of the NWP as 
a gaggle of cantankerous old ladies without a clear mission.170 The 1947 
dispute unfolded just as New Jersey’s highest court was picking up 
Strittmater’s case. Even if the justices avoided the news coverage, the 
the female sex.” MANSBRIDGE, supra note 4, at 9; see also HARRISON, supra note 118,
at 31-32. On labor feminists’ support of this proviso, see COBBLE, supra note 118, at 
68.
164. See RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 32; Rupp, supra note 114, at 729.
165. See RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 28-32. The conflict first erupted in the 1930s 
when influential benefactor Alva Belmont bequeathed $100,000 to the cause, but 
Stevens herself had expected to be the beneficiary. Id. at 29; Sylvia D. Hoffert, Alva 
Vanderbilt Belmont, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALABAMA (Apr. 12, 2011),
http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-3054 [https://perma.cc/E2WV-
GGY4]; see also Rupp, supra note 114, at 727 (outlining that the money was used, in 
part, to purchase Alva Belmont House—the NWP national headquarters in Wash-
ington). Stevens’s side also objected to the NWP’s increased focus on international 
women’s issues and favored domestic organizing. See Martha F. Davis, Not So Foreign 
After All: Alice Paul and International Women’s Rights, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1, 13 (2010).
166. RUPP & TAYLOR, supra note 94, at 28.
167. Id. at 28-32; see also Judith Sealander, Feminist Against Feminist: The First Phase of the 
Equal Rights Amendment Debate, 1923-1963, in 20 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ARTICLES ON WOMEN’S LIVES AND ACTIVITIES,
FEMINIST STRUGGLES FOR SEX EQUALITY 282 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1994).
168. Rupp, supra note 114, at 729.
169. Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
170. See, e.g., Secession Splits the Woman’s Party: Officers Post Guards at Capital Headquar-
ters After Foes Hold Rump Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1947, at 2. Nearby Trenton, 
New Jersey, where the state supreme court sat, the Philadelphia Inquirer reported on 
the fight for entry into “the party’s $100,000 colonial mansion” in its “Washington 
Background” column, which also included a pithy exchange between a “hysterical 
female” and an army clerk. The Inquirer Washington Bureau Staff, Unionist Says 
Umbrella Sets Civilization Pattern, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 18, 1947, at 18. 
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party rupture and subsequent ridicule certainly soured public sentiment 
toward the cause.
While Strittmater was pending and ERA progress stalled on the na-
tional level, New Jersey was actively embracing state constitutional 
change that had mixed results for women. The viability of the federal 
ERA colored the reasonableness of Strittmater’s bequest, but the New 
Jersey constitution directly governed the law that applied to the state 
court probate dispute. New Jersey started out strong on women’s rights: 
It was the only original state that did not flatly deny women the right to 
vote.171 By extending suffrage to any inhabitant, regardless of sex, who 
met certain residency and property requirements, New Jersey’s 1776 
constitution enfranchised many single women.172 However, New Jersey’s 
progressiveness did not last long, and the state legislature restricted the 
vote to white men in 1807.173 With the exception of occasional amend-
ments like these, New Jersey retained its 1844 constitution until 1947, 
when the state conducted a constitutional convention to craft an entire-
ly new document.174 Groups like the New Jersey State Bar Association’s 
Committee on the Status of Women participated in the delegates’ de-
bate over gender equality.175 However, the final document only men-
tioned sex once: Article X specified, “Wherever in this Constitution the 
term ‘person’, ‘persons’, ‘people’ or any personal pronoun is used, the 
same shall be taken to include both sexes.”176 This promise of gender in-
clusivity was a small step forward, but the new constitution relegated sex 
to the realm of semantic interpretation and surely disappointed those 
who had hoped New Jersey might adopt its own state-level equal rights 
amendment.177 Thus, as three tiers of New Jersey judges evaluated the 
171. See Judith Apter Klinghoffer & Lois Elkins, “The Petticoat Electors”: Women’s Suffrage 
in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 159, 159-60 (1992).
172. See id. (“New Jersey defined voters as adult inhabitants ‘worth fifty pounds’ who re-
sided in the state for one year. As married women’s property ownership was invaria-
bly limited, however, only single women could vote.”).
173. Id. at 160.
174. See 1-3 N.J. CONST. CONVENTION OF 1947, https://historicalpubs.njstatelib.org/
The New Jersey Constitution of 1844 still governed the Strittmater decision, which 
the state supreme court issued on May 15, 1947; the constitutional convention began 
a few weeks later, spanning June 12 to September 10, 1947. New Jersey State 
Constitutions, N.J. STATE ARCHIVES, https://www.nj.gov/state/archives/doc
constitution.html.
175. See 3 N.J. CONST. CONVENTION OF 1947, supra note 174, at 412-13.
176. N.J. CONST. art. X., ¶ 4 (N.J. State Archives through 1947 amendments).
177. The potency of the new provision was ambiguous at the time of adoption, but, in 
1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the 1947 revisions as the equivalent 
of an equal rights amendment. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 
477-78 (N.J. 1978); see also Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revis-
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rationality of Strittmater’s “feministic notions,”178 the state was engaged 
in a historic reevaluation of its core principles—and would soon deter-
mine that gender equality was not one.
New Jersey’s Chief Justice Clarence E. Case, who attended the con-
stitutional convention the same year that he presided over the final re-
view of Strittmater’s case, did not show the same solidarity toward ERA 
proponents that he had to suffragists.179 Case, a long-term Jersey City 
resident, had started his career as an attorney in 1902.180 His practice in-
cluded estate disputes, including one in which he represented plaintiffs 
challenging the estate of an “eccentric[]” relative with a “mania for mak-
ing wills.”181 Case went on to serve as president of the state senate dur-
ing the climax of the suffrage movement; in fact, he stepped in as acting 
governor in late January 1920, just a few weeks before New Jersey rati-
fied the Nineteenth Amendment on February 9, 1920.182 Case lamented 
that in the moment of victory, despite all of his and his Republican col-
leagues’ efforts to secure support for the amendment, “the women 
rushed in and bestowed their kisses upon Governor Edwards,” the new-
ly inaugurated Democrat, “who merely signed the bill.”183
On the sixth anniversary of New Jersey’s ratification, Case reflected 
that “women had probably found by this time they could not accom-
plish so much as women rallying around women” and celebrated that 
the “influence of women in politics had been not so much to bring in 
new things as to revive and reburnish old ideas.”184 In Case’s estima-
tion—and apparently to his relief—women had not emerged as a radical 
new voting bloc in the 1920s but instead had had a conservative influ-
ited: Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination,
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1233-34 (2005).
178. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 6.
179. Case also testified at the constitutional convention, weighing in on the restructuring 
of the judiciary. 4 N.J. CONST. CONVENTION OF 1947, supra note 174, at 131-49
(Committee on the Judiciary). The new constitution would transform his twenty-two 
seat “Court of Errors and Appeals” into the seven seat “Supreme Court.” Id. Case, 
who had a long career in state politics and had been appointed chief justice in 1946, 
opted not to weather the transition and resigned a few years later. See Justice Clarence 
Edwards Case, NEW JERSEY COURTS (1950), https://www.njcourts.gov/courts
/supreme/vm/ajdeceased.html [https://perma.cc/SJ2V-85FA].
180. Gov. Clarence Edwards Case, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org
/governor/clarence-edwards-case/ [https://perma.cc/4W74-CSHD].
181. Making Wills His Mania, COAST ADVERTISER (Belmar, N.J.), Sept. 3, 1915, at 6.
182. Senate Ratifies Woman Suffrage, ATL. HIGHLANDS J. (N.J.), Feb. 12, 1920, at 3; 144th 
New Jersey Legislature Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1920, at 32.
183. Republican Women Hear Address by Senator Case, OCEAN GROVE TIMES (N.J.), Aug. 
27, 1926, at 5.
184. Id.
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ence on electoral politics.185 He may have grown to consider “women 
rallying around women” less rational and worthy of his support.186
C. Those Feminine Followers of Freud
Dr. Sara D. Smalley proved to be the caveators’ key witness.187 Alt-
hough she had served as Strittmater’s physician for nearly two decades, 
she showed little fidelity to her patient on the stand.188 Smalley was an 
accomplished physician, but psychology was never one of her specialties. 
She had committed patients to insane asylums but had never studied 
psychology or been affiliated with any psychiatric hospital.189 She herself 
admitted, “I don’t qualify as a mental expert.”190 Nevertheless, she con-
fidently pronounced her diagnosis of Strittmater: “paranoiac dementia 
praecox” of “the Bleuler type of split personality.”191 Swiss psychologist 
Eugen Bleuler, who was Freud’s colleague and occasional critic, coined 
the term “schizophrenia” in an influential 1911 study.192 Yet Bleuler had 
distinguished schizophrenia, which literally means “split mind,” from 
the condition of split personality and the increasingly archaic term, 
185. Id.; see also COTT, supra note 118, at 83-114; see generally Sara Alpern and Dale 
Baum, Female Ballots: The Impact of the Nineteenth Amendment, 16 J. INTERDISC.
HIST. 43 (1985) (analyzing women’s voting patterns in the 1920s). 
186. Republican Women Hear Address by Senator Case, supra note 183.
187. See generally Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 
11, 84-118 (encompassing the doctor’s statements at trial). Because truth is some-
times stranger than fiction, New Jersey’s Dr. Sara D. Smalley had a counterpart 
across the Hudson—Dr. Sarah L. Smalley—who was also something of an anti-
female hired gun, serving as an expert witness in legal disputes that hinged on wom-
en’s mental competence. See, e.g., Vetter v. Asphalt Constr. Co., 205 393 N.Y.S. 
(App. Div. 1924); Setnikar v. Setnikar, 207 N.Y.S. 918 (App. Div. 1925). This Dr. 
Smalley was slightly younger but had greater experience in the field of psychology: A 
1908 graduate of the University of Michigan, she completed her internship at Cen-
tral Islip Psychiatric Center and later rose in the ranks to run the hospital’s women’s
admission service. MICH. ALUMNUS, Oct. 1913-Aug. 1914, at 232. By 1920, she was 
among an elite group of New York psychologists who were still invited to attend the 
State Hospital Commission’s summer institute despite recent budget cuts. State Hos-
pital Commission, 32 ANN. REP. 89, July 1, 1919-June 30, 1920, at 107.
188. See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, 
at 84-85.
189. Id. at 84, 90.
190. Id. at 106.
191. Id. at 91.
192. See Andrew Moskowitz & Gerhard Heim, Eugen Bleuler’s Dementia Praecox or the 
Group of Schizophrenias (1911): A Centenary Appreciation and Reconsideration, 37 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 471, 471 (2011).
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“dementia praecox.”193 Although English translations did not appear un-
til 1950s, Bleuler’s study made an immediate, international impact at 
the time of its 1911 publication.194 Dr. Smalley was clearly familiar with 
it, but her conflation of three very different diagnoses—the Bleuler type, 
split personality, and dementia praecox—suggests a superficial 
knowledge at best.
The Advisory Master was “not impressed” with Smalley’s testimo-
ny, given her lack of credentials, but the higher-level courts accepted the 
doctor’s assessments.195 The appellate judge, quoted in the supreme 
court opinion, “regret[ted] not having had the benefit of an analysis of 
the data by a specialist in diseases of the brain”; nonetheless, he heeded 
his own inexpert medical instinct and resolved that the “factual evidence 
justifie[d]” her diagnosis.196 Relying on Dr. Smalley’s inexpert opinion 
and a heavy dose of his own judicial discretion, the judge concluded 
that Strittmater’s views on gender were symptoms of her mental ill-
ness.197 In sum, “[s]he regarded men as a class with an insane hatred.”198
Americans have always been quick to equate feminism with misan-
dry and madness. In the nineteenth century, many states empowered 
husbands to commit their wives to insane asylums with meager evi-
dence.199 Press ridicule, including allegations of insanity, so intimidated 
some of the women who signed the Declaration of Sentiments at the 
1848 Seneca Falls Convention that many withdrew their support.200
State statutes that disenfranchised women alongside “lunatics and idi-
ots” bolstered anti-suffragists’ arguments that women innately lacked 
the mental capacity to vote.201 The charges of insanity continued 
193. Id. at 472.
194. And, later, Bleuler’s study “powerfully influenced the first diagnostic manuals devel-
oped after World War II.” Id. at 471.
195. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 13.
196. In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205, 205 (N.J. 1947).
197. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205-06.
198. Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205.
199. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 
81-83 (1988) (studying one woman’s involuntary commitment and subsequent ad-
vocacy for higher evidentiary standards in evidentiary proceedings).
200. HOFF, supra note 141, at 34-35. The Seneca Falls Convention was the first gathering 
dedicated to addressing women’s social and legal disabilities and is considered a major 
turning point in first-wave feminism.
201. See generally KIMBERLY A. HAMLIN, FROM EVE TO EVOLUTION: DARWIN, SCIENCE,
AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN GILDED AGE AMERICA (2014) (studying the role evolu-
tionary theory played in the nineteenth-century women’s rights movement); Yvonne 
Pitts, Disability, Scientific Authority, and Women’s Political Participation at the Turn of 
the Twentieth-Century United States, 24 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 37 (2012) (describing 
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through the twentieth century, as suffragists’ tactics grew more militant. 
When Alice Paul was arrested for leading a group of comrades in picket-
ing outside the White House fence, she was placed in the jail’s psycho-
pathic ward and threatened with incarceration in an asylum.202 Paul re-
flected years later, “[P]eople are so apt to say, ‘Well, this lady 
unfortunately was very good in her way, but she was mentally unbal-
anced.’ . . . I could have died in [an] institution, and be there this mo-
ment.”203
Since the early twentieth century, the growing authority of psychia-
try has influenced American conceptions of gender, especially in the le-
gal context. By the 1940s, the popularization of Freudian theory in the 
United States heightened attention to psychosexual interpretations in 
politics and culture.204 The decade’s bestseller lists included studies like 
Dr. Helene Deutsch’s The Psychology of Women: A Psychoanalytic Inter-
pretation (1944) and Dr. Marynia Farnham’s Modern Woman: The Lost 
Sex (1947).205 Although written by women doctors, these books argued 
that women who resisted domesticity risked their own mental health 
and threatened the stability of the nation.206 The psychoanalytic craze 
how anti-suffragists in the late nineteenth century justified women’s disenfranchise-
ment by alleging innate biological disabilities).
202. Interview by Amelia R. Fry with Alice Paul, in Berkeley, Cal. (Nov. 24-26, 1972); 
Today in History—August 28: Picketing for Suffrage, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/item/today-in-history/august-28#picketing-for-suffrage 
[https://perma.cc/QZ8U-C6LM].
203. Interview by Amelia R. Fry with Alice Paul, supra note 202. As late as the 1950s, 
Florence Bayard Hilles, an NWP founder, was committed to an asylum, where she 
died in 1954. See Obituary, Florence Bayard Hilles, LIVING CHURCH, July 4, 1954, at 
14. Paul speculated that Hilles’s daughter and devoutly Catholic son-in-law orches-
trated the institutionalization even though “there was absolutely nothing the matter”
with her in order to “get possession of her fortune.” Interview by Amelia R. Fry with 
Alice Paul, supra note 202.
204. On the rise of psychoanalysis in the postwar period, see ANNE HARRINGTON, MIND 
FIXERS: PSYCHIATRY’S TROUBLED SEARCH FOR THE BIOLOGY OF MENTAL ILLNESS
(2019); ELLEN HERMAN, THE ROMANCE OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY: POLITICAL 
CULTURE IN THE AGE OF EXPERTS (1996); EDWARD SHORTER, A HISTORY OF 
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE AGE OF PROZAC (1998). Sever-
al historians of psychology have foregrounded gender in their analysis. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH LUNBECK, THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSUASION: KNOWLEDGE, GENDER, AND 
POWER IN MODERN AMERICA (1995); Pitts, supra note 201.
205. Editor’s Remarks: “A Book About Women,” 42 CONTEMP. SOC’Y 151, 154 (2013); Dr. 
Marynia Farnham, Author, 79, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1979, at A19.
206. See, e.g., HELENE DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN: A PSYCHOANALYTIC 
INTERPRETATION xii (1944) (“Throughout the ages, the problem of women has puz-
zled people of every kind—you too will have pondered this question in so far as you 
are men. From the women among you that is not to be expected, for you are the rid-
dle yourselves.”).
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had tangible implications on the legal system, as women struggled to 
make cognizable claims and avoid being dismissed as crazy.207 While 
some feminists embraced and built on Freud’s theories, others outright 
objected to his generalizations about the female sex.208 By the 1960s, 
women’s rights activists were fed up with doctors who pathologized oth-
er women: In The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan indicted these 
“feminine follower[s] of Freud” as enemies of their sex.209
One of the earliest and most influential advocates of the view of 
feminism as a mental pathology, Dr. Marynia Farnham, fused psychol-
ogy and politics. Published in January 1947, just as Justice Case’s court 
turned to Strittmater’s case, Modern Woman “aroused a storm of con-
troversy” and was an instant best-seller.210 Regardless of whether the 
New Jersey justices had read the book, it would have been difficult to 
avoid Farnham’s message in popular culture.211 Drawing on case studies, 
the book declared women “one of modern civilization’s major unsolved 
problems—standing in vital importance to everybody, including them-
selves.”212 Farnham deemed the civilizational problem to be particularly 
severe in the 1940s, when “being a woman” had become “more of an 
ordeal than ever.”213 She accused feminists of a nefarious secondary 
scheme. “[O]n the surface,” feminists claimed to focus on women’s edu-
cation, enfranchisement, and property rights, when, in fact, they “were 
out to get rid of their femaleness and to limit male privilege.”214 The 
ERA offered the ultimate example of feminists’ deceit, she argued, pur-
porting to lay “[c]onstitutional groundwork for . . . equal-pay” while ac-
tually advancing “cryptic goals” that “belong in the realm of psycho-
pathology.”215
207. HOFF, supra note 141, at 34.
208. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1949); see also MARI JO BUHLE,
FEMINISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS: A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE WITH PSYCHOANALYSIS 
206-39 (2000); IN DORA’S CASE: FREUD-HYSTERIA-FEMINISM (Charles Bernheimer 
& Claire Kahane, eds., 2d ed. 1990); SAMUEL SLIPP, THE FREUDIAN MYSTIQUE:
FREUD, WOMEN, AND FEMINISM 190-94 (1993).
209. BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 221 (1963).
210. Dr. Marynia Farnham, Author, 79, supra note 205; see also Margaret Mead, Dilemmas 
the Modern Woman Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1947, at BR 18; Philip Wylie, Mascu-
linesque Womenfolk, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 1, 1947, at 13-14 (reviewing FERDINAND 
LUNDBERG & MARYNIA F. FARNHAM, MODERN WOMAN: THE LOST SEX (1947)). 
211. Dr. Marynia Farnham, Author, 79, supra note 205 (describing the popular impact of 
Farnham’s bestselling book).
212. LUNDBERG & FARNHAM, supra note 210, at 1.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 168-69.
215. Id. at 206.
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Farnham reached a wide audience through popular magazines with 
her message that women’s rights had gone too far. For example, her 
1948 Coronet article, “Who Wears the Pants in Your Family?” directly 
questioned women’s property rights and stoked fears that wives were 
overpowering husbands and offered advice for recovering the patriarchal 
status quo.216 She bemoaned, “When Oscar Wilde quipped that ‘All 
men are married women’s property,’ he didn’t realize that within a few 
decades his words would become a grim reality.”217 In Farnham’s ac-
count, the abolition of coverture had not just empowered women to 
hold and dispose of their assets how they wished; it had also enabled 
their domination of men.218 A belligerent “lady generalissimo,” intent on 
conquering male privileges and unwilling to surrender, was “the essence 
of Feminism.”219 The feminist threat had a diagnosable “psychological 
reason,” Dr. Farnham assured.220 But treatment was urgent: 
“[E]verybody would be a lot happier if our women executed a quiet re-
treat from some of their advanced and indefensible positions while they 
may still do so gracefully.”221
Scholars of American women’s history have debated the extent to 
which Dr. Farnham reflected or influenced postwar culture. Earlier ac-
counts labeled Modern Woman the “most influential attack on femi-
nism” of the 1940s, citing the concerns of contemporary women who 
immediately recognized the threat.222 Trailblazing women’s historian 
Mary Beard, who had recently published her groundbreaking work, 
Woman as a Force in History (1946), feared that Farnham’s work en-
sured that “psychiatrists and sexologists [would] be the victors.”223 The 
NWP even called an emergency meeting.224 One member later reported 
“that the book set the movement back a decade.”225 More recent work, 
however, argues that Farnham represented only a “distinctive minority” 
at the “conservative margin.”226 These scholars contend that antifemi-
nist, psychiatric directives for women to retreat into the domestic sphere 
216. Marynia Farnham, Who Wears the Pants in Your Family?, CORONET, Mar. 1948, at 
10. On the controversy Farnham’s article incited, see Meyerowitz, Beyond the Femi-
nine Mystique, supra note 118, at 1476.
217. Farnham, supra note 216, at 10.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 13-14.
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 14. 
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were relatively rare in the popular press and in “no way dominated mass 
culture.”227
Even if the lasting legacy of Dr. Farnham’s work may be disputa-
ble, its immediate relevance to Strittmater is certain. In states like New 
Jersey, the insane delusion standard said nothing of sex; yet the decision 
regarding Strittmater’s will shows that laws that were facially gender 
neutral were often biased in application.228 In their assessments of men-
tal competence, judges embraced the craze for psychoanalysis and “med-
ical” explanations for women’s apparent neuroses and codified them in-
to law.229
D. Policing Spinster Sexuality
Dr. Smalley dealt a further blow to Strittmater’s testamentary eligi-
bility when she dubbed her a “moral pervert.”230 Allegations of 
Strittmater’s perversion saturated the court record. The portrait of 
Strittmater that the caveators painted embodied the “lady generalissi-
mo” of Dr. Farnham’s needling article, “Who Wears the Pants in Your 
Family?”231 They alleged that she stood battle-ready on her New Jersey 
stoop. A former tenant claimed, “she would sit there on the top step [of 
227. Id. at 1458. Meyerowitz also names William Henry Chafe’s foundational 1972 study, 
The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Political, and Economic Roles, 1920-
1970, as an example of a work that overemphasizes the influence of antifeminists like 
Farnham and Lundberg. Id. at 1456 n.3, 1474.
228. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
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calizing Gender: How the Legal and Medical Professions Shaped Women’s Experiences as 
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for Women?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2002); Deborah A. Denno, Who Is An-
drea Yates—A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2003);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 34 STAN. L. REV. 707 
(1982) (reviewing ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL (1980)). For an important body 
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her porch] without any underclothing on exposing herself completely to 
anybody that might pass along the street.”232 Literally and metaphorical-
ly, then, nobody wore the pants in Strittmater’s family. This Subpart 
discusses how the caveators presented evidence alleging Strittmater’s re-
sistance to sexual mores, motherhood, and marriage. They contended 
that Strittmater flaunted her sexuality, in addition to daring to assert her 
property rights and financial independence. This dangerous combina-
tion sounded the death knell of her will.
Panic about the “sexual psychopath” was beginning to sweep the 
nation.233 By 1947, the opportunities for sexual freedom that World 
War II had opened were not completely shut, but a conservative back-
lash was on the horizon.234 Popular culture and public policy issued im-
peratives for personal behavior—propriety, procreation, and consump-
tion were leading tenets—even as Americans responded in diverse ways, 
depending on factors like age, ethnicity, race, religion, and region.235
The postwar years were far from chaste—as a generation of Baby Boom-
ers attests—but policing nonmarital sex became a “national obses-
sion.”236 Alfred Kinsey’s groundbreaking reports on sexual behavior in 
men and women were not published until 1948 and 1953, respectively, 
but society’s paranoia about the “Homosexual Menace” was already be-
ginning to mount.237 Magazines, movies, and a parade of experts stressed 
that individual moral perversion imperiled the nation.238
The push for purity suffused the legal context, too. Since the nine-
teenth century, doctors and jurists had routinely invoked women’s re-
productive functions to explain their erratic mental states and behavior. 
Women, the argument ran, were “prisoners” of tidal biological process-
es—puberty, menstruation, pregnancy, and ultimately menopause—
232. Testimony of Helen Morse, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 61.
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SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 275-300 (1988) (chronicling the revival of paranoia about 
sexual impurity in the postwar period).
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236. MAY, supra note 135, at 94.
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that were beyond their ability to control.239 In the 1940s, such theories 
gained new salience. More than before or since, litigants in this period 
invoked menopause in opposing women’s claims.240 “Psychogenic infer-
tility,” a newfangled diagnosis attributing a woman’s sterility to her 
emotional state, gained popularity not only among gynecologists but al-
so among lawyers.241
Many of the caveators’ arguments squared with longstanding stere-
otypes of feminists, but the court’s particular preoccupation with 
Strittmater’s sexuality presaged the ideology of “domestic containment” 
that would come to pervade the postwar era.242 1947 was too early to 
represent Cold War America, but, in hindsight, Strittmater’s case shows 
inklings of the subsequent turn. Symbolic changes were already afoot: 
For instance, 1947 also marked the release of Dior’s iconic “New Look,” 
which replaced the practical wear of wartime with tiny-waisted, full-
skirted gowns.243 These extravagant designs, which required an abun-
dance of fabric and better befit the lifestyles of homemakers than wage-
earners, displayed postwar prosperity.244 In subsequent years, as the na-
tion strove to contain the Soviet threat abroad, public policy and popu-
lar culture promoted the nuclear family as the best bulwark against nu-
clear destruction.245 More marriages, fewer divorces, and a baby boom 
signified prosperity and peace on the home front, even as suburban 
sprawl simultaneously sharpened racial inequity and women’s discon-
tent.246 Mothers were expected to shoulder the tremendous responsibil-
ity of raising well-adjusted sons and maintaining a stable, sexually ful-
filled, and shelter-ready home.247 This midcentury domestic revival was 
hardly a hegemonic view or universal experience; yet, ideologies of do-
mestic and sexual containment did become part of the postwar zeitgeist 
and, as this story indicates, permeated the legal process.
239. Carroll Smith-Rosenburg & Charles Rosenburg, The Female Animal: Medical and 
Biological Views of Women and Her Role in Nineteenth-Century America, 60 J. AM.
HIST. 332, 336 (1973).
240. Phyllis T. Bookspan & Maxine Kline, On Mirrors and Gavels: A Chronicle of How 
Menopause Was Used as a Legal Defense Against Women, 32 IND. L. REV. 1267, 1287 
(1999).
241. See Randi Hutter Epstein, Emotions, Fertility, and the 1940s Woman, 24 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL’Y 195 (2003).
242. MAY, supra note 135, at 217.
243. JILL FIELDS, AN INTIMATE AFFAIR: WOMEN, LINGERIE, AND SEXUALITY 256 (2007).
244. Id. at 257-71.
245. See MAY, supra note 135, at 19-38.
246. See id. at 3-12.
247. Id. at 102-04.
2021] “ C H A M P I O N  M A N-H A T E R  O F  A L L  T I M E ” 113
Evidence of Strittmater’s sexuality made a splash at trial. As a local 
NWP representative reported back to the national office, the trial court 
recessed after only forty-five minutes so that the estate lawyer could “go 
through two suitcases of books and papers the other lawyer submitted as 
evidence of Miss Strittmater’s mental derangement.”248 That other law-
yer must have recognized the persuasiveness of this show-stopping evi-
dence. The suitcases’ scandalous contents included “a note book full of 
ravings about men” and “books on sex with notations written in the 
margins.”249 Although Strittmater was widely read and her library might 
have been used as evidence to establish her erudition and cognitive 
depth, the lawyer for the estate failed to respond to opposing counsel’s 
predictable choice to introduce books with lurid sexual titles, including 
Iwan Bloch’s Anthropological Studies in the Strangest Sex Acts (1935), Ira 
Wile’s The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult (1934), and an English trans-
lation of the Marquis de Sade’s 120 Days of Sodom (1934).250
Strittmater’s private musings were no less salacious. In the margins of 
one treatise, which detailed a sadistic Australian sex practice that was 
known to kill men, she had scribbled, “Good idea.”251 Although the Ad-
visory Court Master ultimately sided with Strittmater, he still consid-
ered the contents of her sexual library “ample proof of an unwholesome, 
heated imagination.”252 According to the NWP observer, the judge 
clearly found the evidence stimulating, “devouring . . . and apparently 
reveling in the dirt.”253 The sexual arguments and innuendos introduced 
by the caveators at trial clearly affected the final disposition of the case. 
The highest court opinion concluded, “memoranda and comments 
written by decedent on the margins of books constitute the chief evi-
dence of her mental condition.”254
Strittmater’s marital status was another central theme. In recount-
ing Strittmater’s biography, the appellate judge began: “The deceased 
never married.”255 The significance of that fact was hammered home at 
trial. Strittmater’s former friend, Jane Beech, put it plainly, “[S]he never 
wanted to meet any man, she had no time for them.”256 In a testy ex-
248. Letter from Leslie Black to Burnita Shelton Matthews, supra note 43.
249. Id.
250. Exhibits, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at vi, viii.
251. Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 8.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Letter from Leslie Black to Burnita Shelton Matthews, supra note 43.
254. In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205, 205 (N.J. 1947).
255. Prerogative Court Memorandum, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 23.
256. Testimony of Jane M. Beech, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 183.
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change with Beech, the estate attorney tried to pin Strittmater’s mental 
health on her marital status:
Q. You knew that she was a single woman?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You knew that had some effect upon her personality, 
didn’t you?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. The fact that she was a single woman?
A. No, I know single women who are perfectly well bal-
anced.257
In the end, the caveators’ logic prevailed. The appellate judges conclud-
ed that Strittmater’s singlehood was a symptom of her insanity, not an
excuse for her harsh views on men.258
Implicit anxieties about Strittmater’s potential same-sex attraction 
also run throughout the court record, typifying long-held stigmas about 
feminists’ unfemininity as well as pathologies of lesbianism unique to 
the era.259 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ameri-
cans had regarded intimacy among women as innocent “romantic 
friendship”; in the early twentieth century, such behavior assumed the 
labels of “mannish” and “pervers[e].”260 By the 1920s, Freud and other 
sexologists had redefined same-sex intimacy as “morbid and pathologi-
cal.”261 In the postwar era, historians suggest, “the lesbian ‘sicko’ became 
the dominant image . . . and curing lesbians on the couch became a big 
business in America.”262
When it came to Strittmater’s image, then, the caveators’ counsel’s 
examination of Jane Beech proved particularly devastating. Beech testi-
fied that the two had become fast friends after meeting at the Bloom-
field library in 1929.263 With her husband frequently traveling for work, 
Beech would invite Strittmater over to her apartment for extended vis-
its, two or three times a week.264 When her husband was home—
apparently his job as an asbestos salesman had its ups and downs—
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258. See Strittmater, 53 A.2d at 205-66.
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Strittmater made herself scarce.265 One afternoon, Beech’s husband re-
turned unexpectedly, and, before he could come up the elevator, 
Strittmater “ran downstairs quick, grabb[ing] her things” without saying 
goodbye.266 Much to Strittmater’s disappointment, the Beeches moved 
to Philadelphia for a few years in the mid-1930s.267 Strittmater and 
Beech arranged a weekend visit, but their time together was strained, 
with Strittmater suffering from anxiety and upset about their differing 
expectations for their relationship.268 A respectable married woman, 
Beech did not dare get more explicit about the details on the stand, but 
her testimony strongly hinted that Strittmater considered her more than 
a friend and had behaved like a jilted lover.269 The estate lawyer did little 
to rebut these insinuations and focused most of his questions on 
Strittmater’s financial independence and reliability as a landlord.270
The record was also rife with references to Strittmater’s reproduc-
tive incapacity and her outlandish views on procreation. Perceived as 
worse even than rejecting heterosexual marriage was Strittmater’s spurn-
ing of the ostensibly natural imperative of motherhood.271 By the time 
of her death, the forty-eight-year-old Strittmater had no children and 
had already gone through menopause.272 Allegedly, Strittmater objected 
to men’s essential role in procreation. Ida Whitson, a former tenant, re-
ported that Strittmater had once told her, “[Y]ou know, you don’t have 
to live with a man to have any children.”273 The appellate court seized 
on this statement and cited as evidence of Strittmater’s insanity that she 
“looked forward to the scientific day when women could bear children 
without the aid of men.”274 In a 1937 diary entry introduced at trial, 
Strittmater had written, “Male lust is a vicious disease, literally a cancer 
in the side of the race.”275 In 1944, when Strittmater developed a can-
265. For a record of Beech’s husband’s profession, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
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cerous stomach tumor, Dr. Smalley (who well knew Strittmater was too 
old to conceive a child) described it as the size of a “seven-and-a-half-
month-old fetus.”276 Within months, Strittmater died from this “vicious 
disease” in her side.277 While Strittmater’s musings about motherhood 
without men contributed to the invalidation of her will, Smalley’s tes-
timony suggested that her metaphoric motherhood was literally lethal.
Figure 1: John F. Hinternhoff, Champion Man-Hater of All Time, ST. LOUIS 
GLOBE DEM., Oct. 23, 1946, at 11.
Conclusion
While Strittmater’s story has since been lost to law students and 
historians, contemporary journalists did take note. The case of the 
“Champion Man-Hater of All Time” made headlines across the coun-
276. Testimony of Dr. Sara D. Smalley, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 92; 
id. at 93 (“I knew she was an old woman and I knew that she wasn’t pregnant. It was 
so obvious.”).
277. Response Brief, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra note 11, at 17 (referring to diary en-
try, Exhibit C-50); Advisory Master’s Conclusions, in STRITTMATER RECORD, supra
note 11, at 6.
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try, and even in Canada.278 Local New Jersey dailies hailed the appellate 
decision.279 “Miss Louisa Strittmater’s last earthly wish, to show her ut-
ter contempt for men, was rejected today,” a Passaic paper gloated.280 In 
farther-flung cities, some newspapers published lengthy reports, replete 
with sensational tidbits from the court transcript and mocking car-
toons.281 The St. Louis Globe Democrat dedicated the front page of its 
women’s section to the case, jesting: “Nothing less than Death could 
have forced Miss Strittmater to leave the ramparts she had so long 
manned. (Maybe that isn’t the word, but you get the meaning.)”282 The 
attendant cartoon (above) cast Strittmater as a belligerent old woman 
defending her bunker against a male intruder. With an arched brow, 
high-coiffed hair, and high-backed chair, Strittmater typified the Victo-
rian spinster.283 A quarter-century after the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
passage, men could celebrate that frigid first-wave feminists like 
Strittmater were at last a dying breed. Many younger women also lam-
pooned the older generation for “manning” ramparts that they had opt-
ed to abandon.284 At the close of World War II, as the nation was soon 
to head “homeward bound,” Strittmater declined to give up her fight.285
Strittmater’s story also shows us that social movement mobilization 
may hinge on an element of delusion. Advocates must convince sup-
porters to suspend rational, self-interested calculations in service of lofti-
er—and maybe less likely—aims. A totally temperate personality rarely 
lends itself to political radicalism; a dash of eccentricity is often integral 
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1946, at 1, and Seek to Set Aside Man-Hater’s Will, EDMONTON J. (Edmonton, Alta., 
Can.), Aug. 30, 1946, at 11.
279. See, e.g., Court Overrules Spinster’s Hate for Mere Males, supra note 71, at 13.
280. Man-Hater Adjudged Paranoiac: Male Kin Share in Her Estate, HERALD-NEWS (Pas-
saic, N.J.), Aug. 30, 1946, at 3.
281. An article titled Court Sets Aside Will Typifying Spinster’s Hatred of Men was published 
in multiple papers. See Court Sets Aside Will Typifying Spinster’s Hatred of Men, OUR 
S. HOME (Livingston, Ala.), Sept. 26, 1946, at 2; Court Sets Aside Will Typifying Spin-
ster’s Hatred of Men, HOPE PIONEER (Hope, N.D.), Sept. 26, 1946, at 7; Court Sets 
Aside Will Typifying Spinster’s Hatred of Men, HARDWICK GAZETTE (Hardwick, Vt.), 
Sept. 26, 1946, at 7; Court Sets Aside Will Typifying Spinster’s Hatred of Men, BEAVER 
PRESS (Beaver, Utah), Sept. 27, 1946, at 6.
282. Hinternhoff, supra note 79.
283. For more on the Victorian spinster or “old maid” archetype, see Anna Lepine, The 
Old Maid in the Garret: Representations of the Spinster in Victorian Literature 
(2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ottawa) (on file with the 
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law).
284. See Rupp, supra note 114, at 739-40 (explaining that the NWP of the 1940s and 
1950s “only halfheartedly tried” to recruit younger women and ended up alienating 
many).
285. See MAY, supra note 135, 1-18.
118 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 28:75
to seeing beyond the status quo. Yet, this essential ingredient also invites 
scrutiny, and allegations of delusion can subvert and dismantle a move-
ment. Perhaps Strittmater knew this when she wrote to Du Bois back in 
1932. She contended, “[E]volution . . . must be bought and paid for, 
like everything else; and the coin for its purchase, in the absence of 
power, is conciliation.”286 She had been saving up, hoarding gold coins 
in her basement, ready to pay a price for progress. But, lacking power or 
the willingness to compromise, Strittmater could not overcome the 
stigma of delusion.
More than just a problematic precedent, Strittmater exposes a 
world in which a “Champion Man-Hater” was not only a humorous 
headline but also a credible threat to the postwar order, which courts 
sought to help erect. Even if the 1940s did not represent a peak period 
of feminist mobilization, opponents were on the offensive, policing the 
bounds of women’s progress and defining the markers of insanity. The 
nation emerged from World War II eager to reestablish domestic tran-
quility, but ERA advocates refused to abandon their own battle. This 
unwelcome war between women’s insistence on equality and the legal 
system’s resistance to it simmered on low boil. The “man-haters” did 
not surrender, but they did not walk away champions either.
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